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1. Introduction1 
If alcohol imposes social costs well in excess of the excise tax paid by drinkers, we might 
presume that an increase in taxes or regulation targeting the social costs of drinking 
would be consistent with economic efficiency: the social cost avoided by the tax increase 
or regulatory imposition would likely exceed the benefits forgone by drinkers consequent 
to the tax. “Cost of illness” (COI) studies (Collins & Lapsley 2002, 2008; BERL 2009; 
Rehm et al 2009 among many others) suggest alcohol’s social costs far exceed the excise 
tax collected.  
We argue that the standard economic case for intervention, which relies on identifying 
instances in which the marginal social costs of consumption exceed marginal private 
costs, is not established by Cost of Illness studies. First, these studies summarily ignore 
the differences between marginal and total costs. Even were it the case that total external 
cost exceeded total collected taxes, feasible interventions including excise tax increases 
can remain undesirable where marginal external costs are less than the excise rate. Barker 
(2002) reminds us that linear excise taxes are at best imperfect mechanisms for dealing 
with rather large heterogeneity in external cost imposition. Second, Cost of Illness studies 
typically ignore or deliberately blur the distinction between internally and externally 
borne costs. These studies calculate social-cost figures that generally include a large 
proportion of costs falling on the drinker and on other parties more typically considered 
to be in contract with the drinker, which economists usually identify as private and not 
policy-relevant. We here mostly address problems arising from the conflation of private 
and social costs while noting the reasonably large problems also caused by the 
abandoning of marginal analysis. 
In Section 2 we briefly outline the distinction between private and social costs in the 
economic literature. We review the types of costs that can give rise to inefficiency in 
standard welfare economics and discuss augmentations of that standard model to account 
for concerns raised in the behavioural economics literature.  In Section 3 we review the 
Cost of Illness literature and contrast the standard economic model described in Section 2 
with the Cost of Illness method. The policy conclusions drawn from COI studies are 
unsound; while policy conclusions can be drawn from external cost studies that employ 
standard economic method, the method of COI studies varies far too greatly from the 
more standard economic approach to allow the drawing of policy conclusions. Section 4 
provides two case studies. Section 5 assesses the influence of cost of illness studies on 
policy debates. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 This project was supported in part by the National Alcohol Beverage Industry Council (NABIC) through 
a grant administered by the Research & Innovation Office and the College of Business and Economics at 
the University of Canterbury. We thank Nick Sander and Rachel Webb for excellent research assistance 
and participants at the 2011 New Zealand Economics Association meetings for comment. We also thank 
Seamus Hogan for careful review and comment; the standard disclaimer applies. 
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2. Costs and Benefits in Neoclassical Welfare Economics 
Economic measures of social cost are meaningful because of the method by which they 
are derived. Where other methods of cost tabulation are employed, the conclusions that 
can be drawn from findings of net social costs are very limited.  
In the standard economic approach, choice reveals preference. If an individual purchases 
a product, he must judge the total benefits of that action as exceeding its total costs. He 
could ex post find himself to have erred, but his choice was rational ex ante. This holds 
for both market and non-market choices: an individual deciding to catch a ride with a 
friend rather than walk to work has judged that the chosen option has greater net benefits 
or smaller net costs for himself; if the friend agrees to give him the ride, he too must have 
determined that the benefits exceeded the costs.  
When individual optimising agents meet and interact in efficient markets, outcomes are 
Pareto-Efficient. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics (see Varian, 1992, p. 326, for 
example) limits the scope of welfare enhancing public policy intervention to correction of 
market failures: internalizing external costs, ameliorating information asymmetries 
through information provision, and antitrust policy.2  
Economists recognise that conditions required for the First Theorem do not hold in real 
world settings. Indeed, the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem3 suggests that situations in which 
the conditions hold will be the exception rather than the norm. Deviations from 
blackboard ideals have been incorporated into basic neoclassical welfare economics using 
well-established methods. The failure of the real world to conform with the assumptions 
underlying the First Welfare Theorem do not justify abandoning the framework. 
It is useful to define failure in consumption. As we discuss in section 4, it appears that a 
failure in consumer decision making is frequently defined in the alcohol social cost 
literature by noticing ex post strongly negative outcomes to which no rational person 
would choose to submit. But consumption decisions are made ex ante, and negative 
outcomes ex post are not sufficient to define failure in decision making. Consumers may 
rationally and with full knowledge choose to bear risk of a negative outcome in exchange 
for a compensating benefit. That occasionally the negative outcome occurs neither proves 
suboptimal decision-making has occurred nor justifies policy intervention. The correct 
test of failure in consumer decision making is to identify the behaviours consumers 
undertake that would not occur but for imperfections in rationality or information, and 
but for the presence of externalities. 
Three potential market failures are relevant when tabulating the social costs of substance 
abuse. Most prominently, costs or benefits of individual actions falling on persons 
external to the deciding agent and not part of a contractual or quasi-contractual 
arrangement that internalise the external effect are defined as externalities and can give 
                                                 
2 For summaries of the market failure literature, see Cowen (1988), The Theory of Market Failure: A 
Critical Examination, and Cowen and Crampton (2002), Market Failure or Success: The New Debate. 
3 Greenwald, Bruce and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), “Externalities in economies with imperfect information 
and incomplete markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101: 229-264. 
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rise to inefficiency. In the presence of negative externalities, we typically expect that too 
much of an activity is undertaken at the margin relative to the optimum. Second, 
imperfect information can generate market failure. Finally, deviations away from 
rationality can yield significant departures from optimal choices. We will take each of 
these in turn. 
2.1. Externalities 
Since the Coasean revolution (Coase 1960), externality problems have been viewed as a 
function of either inadequately-specified property rights or of transactions costs. Either of 
these gives rise to a “missing market” such that a party imposing costs on others has little 
reason to count those costs in his optimisation; inefficiency results4. If a driver has a 
greater likelihood of being involved in a road accident while inebriated, he will weigh the 
increased risk of costs to himself but will pay less heed of costs he may impose on 
pedestrians when deciding whether to drive. There is no market in which either a 
pedestrian can pay the driver to stay off the road or the driver can pay pedestrians for 
assuming the increased risk of accident. Consequently, the inebriated driver imposes an 
external cost on pedestrians that can be measured identically by summing the product of 
the increased probability of accident imposed on each by the average cost of an accident, 
or by tallying the realised cost to pedestrians and sober drivers of drunk drivers.  
But no missing market exists when affected and affecting parties are linked through a 
contractual or quasi-contractual nexus. Merger is a standard solution to inter-firm 
externality problems, unifying decision-making within a single agent that takes account 
of costs and benefits to the entity as a whole. Firms may err in choosing the production 
mix that maximises profits across the merged units, but such errors do not constitute a 
policy relevant market failure. Similarly, while a common assault on a stranger is an 
external cost borne by the victim, a boxing match is not a market failure: agreement 
internalises what would otherwise be external costs.  
Similarly, intrafamily effects should generally be seen as having been internalised. While 
some intrafamily effects fall so far beyond the normal grounds of marriage contract that 
their costs can be deemed social – family violence, for example – counting all intrafamily 
decisions as socially relevant would lead to absurdities. If we count the drinker’s 
spending on alcohol as a cost to his family, what of the non-drinker’s spending on golf 
clubs? The Australian Treasury writes of economic costs:  
These costs are more limited in scope than those used in the cost of illness methodologies 
that have been developed in the public health literature (for example, Collins & Lapsley 
2008), which also include many of the costs that individuals bear themselves. To estimate 
spillover costs relevant for setting rates of tax, it is necessary to exclude private 
intangible costs (such as pain and suffering), and the loss of household production from 
premature death or sickness. That said, the distinction between private costs and 
spillover costs is not always clear. For example, if a family utility and decision making 
model is used, alcohol-related violence against family members and the loss of family 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Varian (2006, pp. 626-7); Boadway and Wildason (1984, pp. 61-2), among many 
others.  
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disposable income are private costs; but, if an individual utility and decision making 
model is used, costs borne by other family members are spillovers. (Australia’s Future 
Tax System, Vol 2., p.435)  
Coasean considerations lean heavily towards treating the family as a single unit for 
analysis, and could extend to deeming family violence as being internalised; we propose 
simply drawing the line such that the costs and benefits of legal activities occurring 
within families be counted as internalised by that family.5 
Following Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962), externalities are only Pareto-relevant, and 
consequently only of interest for ameliorative policy, when they are technological rather 
than pecuniary and when the cost of abatement is less than the cost imposed: in other 
words, cases in which the outcome would differ if the missing market were to exist. 
Fiscal externalities, described by Browning (1999) as a pecuniary externality running 
through the tax system, seem to drive much of the popular impetus for taxation of health-
related behaviours. Take as a baseline the case in which individual alcohol consumption 
is invariant to whether health care costs are privately or publicly borne. In that case, fiscal 
externalities are a pure transfer. As a pecuniary externality, they are of no efficiency 
consequence (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962). But voters are not insensitive to 
pecuniary externalities (Holcombe and Sobel 2001). Consequently, alcohol excise taxes 
are set to defray this transfer cost. But because alcohol excise taxes cannot be adjusted to 
the drinker’s individual circumstances while private health insurance premiums can be, 
the combination of public insurance and excise taxes is necessarily less efficient than 
private insurance and no excise taxes. Low and moderate drinkers will face the same 
marginal alcohol excise tax rate as heavy drinkers while incurring far lower, or negative, 
health risks; light drinkers will consume too little relative to the optimum while heavy 
drinkers will consume too much. The alcohol excise tax that perfectly recovers all 
alcohol-related health care expenditures remains distortionary (Barker, 2002). 
Alcohol consumption does increase when the state defrays consequent health care costs. 
Klick (2006), for example, finds that state insurance mandates requiring that insurers 
provide coverage for alcoholism increased state alcoholism rates. The extent to which 
this behavioural response is inefficient depends largely on the relative elasticity of 
different cohorts of drinkers to public defraying of health care costs.  
As a thought experiment, imagine that we move from the world without excise taxes and 
without public provision of alcohol-related health care services to the world in which 
                                                 
5 Further, Gary Becker’s “Rotten Kid” theorem demonstrates that the existence of an altruistic “benefactor” 
member within a family is sufficient to induce family-regarding behaviour among other non-altruistic 
family members. Suppose that one child in the family is “rotten”, having only regard for his own welfare 
and none for that of his parents or siblings. Even the rotten kid will refrain from harming the family’s 
interest because the altruistic parent’s bequest motive ensures internalization. The theory generalizes to any 
case where selfish family members interact with a member acting as altruistic benefactor. 
The theorem breaks down in families without an effective altruist: where both spouses are “rotten” or 
where both parents and children are “rotten”. But where there exists not even minimal altruism among 
family members, alcohol policy is not the appropriate solution; rather, family dissolution is most efficient. 
See Becker (1981). 
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alcohol-related health care services are fully funded by an alcohol excise tax set such that 
aggregate tax revenues match aggregate health expenditures. In the ex ante world, private 
insurers charged a fair premium to those drinkers consuming more than four drinks daily 
and efficient levels of alcohol consumption obtained. Ex post, moderate drinkers see an 
excise tax somewhat above their prior health care premium; heavy drinkers see a large 
price reduction.6 Consequently, moderate drinkers reduce consumption while heavy 
drinkers increase consumption.  
Here, relative price elasticities and non-linearities in health costs begin to bite. Even if 
moderate drinkers reduced their consumption by as much as heavy drinkers increased 
their consumption, aggregate health costs would increase as moderate drinking confers 
health benefits while the health costs of heavy drinking rise quickly with increased 
consumption. While heavy drinkers experience a relatively larger price change, they are 
roughly sixty percent as price responsive as moderate drinkers (Wagenaar et al, 2009). 
The total tax required to cover the aggregate health costs of heavy drinking can exceed 
the aggregate health insurance premiums that would have been collected in the ex ante 
world; the ability to externalise fiscal health costs then yields a real inefficiency rather 
than simply a pecuniary externality. However, this real inefficiency will be small relative 
to the overall alcohol excise tax take as consumption is relatively inelastic.  
The primary social costs of alcohol use, in an economic framework, will consist of those 
costs that drinkers impose directly on external parties. The bulk of costs accruing to the 
public health system are properly viewed as a transfer – a pecuniary externality without 
efficiency consequence. True inefficiencies resulting from consumption distortions when 
health costs are subsidised can either be accrued as costs of harmful alcohol use or as 
costs of subsidising risk-taking behaviours through the public health system. We 
nevertheless count transfer costs imposed through the health system as an external cost of 
alcohol use. Internally borne costs only count as socially relevant in the presence of other 
market failures. 
2.2. Information and rationality failures 
Imperfect information about the costs or benefits of alcohol consumption could yield sub- 
or supra-optimal consumption relative to the consumer’s ideal point. The deadweight 
costs of such errors – the excess of gross costs over gross benefits for the excess portion 
of consumption – can be viewed as a social cost. But information itself can be costly: if 
the deadweight costs avoided by information acquisition are outweighed by the costs of 
acquiring that information, the consumer will have erred overall even if he then consumes 
the ideal amount of alcohol. Further, consumption of most goods, including alcohol, is a 
“repeated game”; we should expect learning to moderate the frequency and severity 
(though not eliminate) mistakes in consumption decisions. Where policymakers believe 
that imperfect information causes harm, the correct market intervention is subsidisation 
of information provision such that consumers acquire the desired amount of information. 
If consumer behaviour persists despite the provision of the information necessary for 
                                                 
6 The high insurance costs that previously fell on a small group of heavy drinkers are spread more evenly 
across all drinkers. 
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informed choice and other market failures are not present, economists typically conclude 
that the choice was optimal even if disfavoured by policymakers.7 
In the last twenty years, attention has been increasingly paid in the economic literature to 
apparent failures by consumers to optimise behaviour in some circumstances. This is the 
focus of the comparatively new field of behavioural economics, which has demonstrated 
persistent deviations in consumer behaviour from the theoretical ideals which underpin 
revealed preference and consequently the first welfare theorem. 
The social cost of alcohol literature frequently asserts imperfections in consumer 
rationality as a source of failure in consumption decisions, but without defining the term 
‘rationality’. The implied view is that there is a failure among consumers to maximise 
health, but this definition of irrationality does not exclude the possibility of rational 
maximisation of some other objective. Sen (2002, pp. 39-40) draws out the distinction 
between maximisation and maximand using the (we trust) hypothetical example of a man 
cutting off his toes with a blunt knife. Can rationality be defined without reference to 
preferences, however bizarre? Sen says no: an assessment of rationality requires 
examination of the goal as well. The distinction is important: we suspect the social cost of 
alcohol literature might be less influential if an express definition of rationality revealed 
that the basis for the majority of alcohol-related costs in this literature was simply that 
consumers behave so as to maximise objectives other than those that health researchers 
would prefer. We will henceforth use the term “healthist” to refer to the implied view 
common in the alcohol social cost literature that maximization of health outcomes is the 
only allowable goal in consumer choice.8 
Related to imperfections in rationality is ‘internalities’, which considers time 
inconsistency in decision making. The field of behavioural economics has developed in 
response to dissatisfaction with traditional explanations of consumer behaviour. Gruber 
(2002) says that motivation for the development of the concept of internalities is from 
noticing the disconnection among smokers between their desire to quit smoking and their 
unwillingness to actually quit. This implies hyperbolic discounting and time 
inconsistency of preferences: “tomorrow’s self” is more patient than today’s and would 
like “today’s self” to commit to quitting smoking. According to Gruber, public policy can 
operate as a commitment device to move consumers to their preferred consumption: tax 
increases on cigarettes, for example, can raise consumer welfare because taxes are an 
effective commitment device that cannot be privately organised. 
The concept of internalities is behind the ‘nudge’ principle of Sunstein and Thaler 
(2008): choice of default settings in public policy can move people toward desirable 
consumption decisions without using coercion if individuals retain the freedom to opt 
away from the default option. The economic theory on which the idea of the nudge is 
                                                 
7 A second-best case for taxation can be made where information uptake is very costly for consumers. If 
irrationally incurred internal consumption costs were more elastic to tax measures than to information 
provision, and if the marginal harm of tax measures on moderate drinkers were low, excise could be 
preferable. Again, and as always, analysis at the margin is required to determine whether any policy passes 
cost benefit analysis. 
8 Crampton, Eric. 2009. “Public health and the new paternalism”, Policy (Spring).  
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based is strongly contested (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). Hyperbolic discounting provides 
the basis for many purported behavioural biases: individuals will too-heavily weigh the 
present relative to the near or distant future. Some researchers label such behaviour as 
irrational.9 But while laboratory evidence exists for hyperbolic discounting in particular 
settings, Anderson et al (2010) find no evidence of substantial hyperbolically discounting 
behaviour in a field experiment involving a wide sample of adult Danes. Findings of 
hyperbolic discounting may be fragile to choice of experimental subjects and laboratory 
settings.  Levitt and List (2007) similarly urge caution in extrapolating from economic 
laboratory results to real world settings.  
Furthermore, if irrationalities plague individual decision makers, what reason have we to 
believe that policy makers are isolated from similar problems? Individuals may make 
errors, and policy choices may help them to avoid those errors, but biases in voter 
perceptions are certainly not unknown either (Caplan, 2001b; Crampton 2009, among 
many others). Berggren (2011) notes that less than five percent of articles in behavioural 
economics that advance policy recommendations pay any attention to whether 
behavioural anomalies also may be present in political decision-making. 
In the case in which failures of rationality result in excess alcohol consumption, it can be 
proper to count the deadweight costs of the excess portion of consumption as being 
socially relevant. But without a benchmark for rational consumption, it is impossible to 
make such quantification. As will be discussed in Section 4, the alcohol cost literature 
squares the circle by assuming that all consumption by a drinker who is deemed to be 
irrational or to lack sufficient information is of zero gross benefit; where full and perfect 
information is deemed a condition of rational choice, this is hardly an adequate basis for 
cost assessment. Further, setting excise taxes to internalise costs that are already internal 
to the drinker seems unlikely to prove beneficial. The irrational drinker who is price 
insensitive will simply incur higher personal costs while providing a transfer to the 
government; the irrational drinker who is price sensitive will not enjoy benefits unless the 
avoided self-imposed cost is greater than his increased tax burden. 
That imperfections in consumer behaviour exist and are of interest and relevance to 
policy setting is not in question. Whether public policy, accounting for government 
imperfections and failure, is capable of producing benefits sufficient to justify their cost 
and improve efficiency are not addressed here. For our purposes it is sufficient to note 
that imperfections in rationality, information, and the existence of externalities and 
internalities may be incorporated into the welfare analysis of consumer purchasing and 
consumption of alcohol.  
                                                 
9 Rizzo and Whitman (2007) survey the literature asserting policy consequence of irrational hyperbolic 
discounting. Note that Rasmusen (2008) and Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009) warn that hyperbolic 
discounting can be consistent with rationality. 
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3. Literature Review 
Since the 1970s, many studies have used economic methods to estimate the costs of 
alcohol consumption or abuse to society.  Precisely what these studies have attempted to 
estimate has varied.  Some studies have attempted to estimate the external costs of 
alcohol abuse,10 but the majority has taken a “cost of illness” (COI) approach to 
measuring costs.11 The COI approach to measuring the cost of alcohol consumption and 
abuse is borrowed from earlier studies that estimated the costs of other illnesses and drug 
abuse (Rice, 1967). Generally speaking, COI studies attempt to estimate the gross direct 
and indirect costs to society of alcohol consumption or abuse.12 Under the broad COI 
umbrella, though, there is considerable diversity in method and results.  
The first generation of COI studies follow Rice in understanding social cost as costs 
accruing to drinkers themselves (private costs) as well as the costs imposed on unwilling 
third parties (external costs), with no distinction made between these two categories.13 
This COI method, which Robson and Single (1995) refer to as the “US-PHS” approach, 
was systematized by a 1979 taskforce (Hodgson & Meiners, 1979). The purpose of these 
studies was to estimate the gross costs to society of alcohol use or abuse above the costs 
of producing the alcoholic beverage itself. Without any examination of offsetting benefits 
or drawing distinction between externalities and private costs, these studies offered no 
justification for government intervention in alcohol consumption. These studies were 
instead justified as setting priorities and acting as a basis for cost-benefit analysis 
(Harwood, 1991; Rice, 2000). 
A new approach to estimating the social costs of alcohol abuse, also labelled COI, was 
pioneered by Collins and Lapsley (1991) and systemized by a series of working groups 
beginning in 1994 which culminated in Single et al (2003), International guidelines for 
estimating the costs of substance abuse. Collins and Lapsley modified the gross cost 
method in three major ways. The first major modification was to introduce express 
consideration of private costs to their analysis and then to label their resulting estimates 
                                                 
10 Heien & Pittman, 1993; Laslett et al., 2010; Manning, Keeler, & Newhouse, 1991. The New Zealand 
Treasury’s estimate (Barker, 2002) focused on external costs of alcohol consumption, which were found to 
approximate the aggregate alcohol excise tax take. 
11 Adrian, 1988; Baird, Lanctot, & Clough, 2004; Barkey, 2009; Berry & Boland, 1977; Cabinet Office, 
2003; Chung, Chun, & Lee, 2006; D. J. Collins & Lapsley, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2008; Cruze, Harwood, 
Kristiansen, J. J. Collins, & Jones, 1981; Devlin, Scuffham, & Bunt, 1997; Easton, 1997; Fenoglio, Parel, 
& Kopp, 2003; FGS McClure Watters & York Health Economics Consortium, 2010; Harwood, Fountain, 
& Livermore, 1998, 2000; Johansson et al., 2006; Lima & Esquerdo, 2003; Liu, 2002; McDonnell & 
Maynard, 1985; McDowell Group, 2005; Montarat et al., 2010; Nakamura, Tanaka, & Takano, 1993; 
Parker, Shultz, Gertz, Berkelman, & Remington, 1987; Rehm et al., 2007; Rice, 1993; Rice, Kelman, & L. 
Miller, 1991; Rice, Kelman, L. Miller, & Dunmeyer, 1990; Roeber, 2009; Rosen, T. R. Miller, & Simon, 
2008; Saar, 2009; Salomaa, 1995; Single, Robson, Xie, & Rehm, 1998; Slack, Nana, Webster, Stokes, & 
Wu, 2009; Varney & Guest, 2002; Whelan, Josephson, & Holcombe, 2008; Xie, Rehm, Single, Robson, & 
Paul, 1998; York Health Economics Consortium, 2010. 
12 In the COI literature, the term abuse is generally defined by consumption in excess of medically 
recommended limits. 
13 Cruze et al., 1981; Nakamura et al., 1993; Rice 1993; Rice et al., 1990, 1991.  
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net cost. By deducting private costs from gross costs, the Collins and Lapsley definition 
of net cost resembled, in theory if not in practice, what economists call social cost, i.e. 
total costs in excess of private benefits, or policy-relevant consumption externalities. 
While this approach seemingly has greater policy relevance than the first generation of 
COI studies, it can be misleading: the exclusion of private costs by Collins and Lapsley is 
nominal. Collins and Lapsley (1991, p. 48) define private as “costs knowlingly and freely 
borne by the consumer or producer” and social cost as “all other costs either not 
knowingly or not knowingly and freely borne by the consumer or producer”. In later 
iterations of their method Collins and Lapsley further narrowed the definition of private 
cost to include only those costs in which consumers are fully informed, consistently 
rational and who bear the entire cost of their consumption (Collins and Lapsley 2008, p. 
9). Collins and Lapsley (2008, p.9) hold that, “[o]nly if all three conditions are 
simultaneously satisfied will the resultant costs be private costs.” This is a definition of 
private cost that has the effect of eliminating virtually all private cost, substantially 
increasing the share of costs defined as social cost, as will be discussed at length in 
Section 4. 
The second significant innovation by Collins and Lapsley was the inclusion of the costs 
of producing alcohol as social cost where that production was for that part of alcohol 
consumption that is abusive. This counting of production costs as social cost was a 
product of following a too-narrow definition of private costs to its logical conclusion. A 
third innovation by Collins and Lapsley was to include measures of intangible costs such 
as pain and suffering, with others following (Cabinet Office, 2003; Easton, 1997; 
Johansson et al., 2006; Rosen et al., 2008; Salomaa, 1995; BERL, 2009; York Health 
Economics Consortium, 2010).  
Net cost as defined by Collins and Lapsley is neither gross total costs nor external costs, 
yet it is this definition that was adopted by the Single et al Guidelines14 and has 
subsequently been used by a number of COI studies.15 The Single et al Guidelines were 
designed to provide a general framework for estimating the social costs of substance 
abuse in order to increase comparability, but the advice offered leaves room for 
interpretation and confusion. Some have understood the Guidelines to be interested in 
only external costs in the normal economic sense.16 Even the authors of the Guidelines 
seem to differ in their interpretation. While Collins and Lapsley see social cost as being 
the net cost to society not offset by private benefits, Single and co-authors in their study 
of Canada state they are following the earlier version of the Single et al Guidelines in 
defining social costs as “the sum of the private and external costs after adjusting for 
transfers within society” (Single et al., 1998, p. 992). It is perhaps not surprising to 
observe wide variation in social cost estimates and misinterpretations of findings by 
media and politicians. Moreover, even those agreeing on the basic definition of social 
cost often disagree about the precise categories that should be included. For example, 
                                                 
14 Single et al., 2003, pp. 8-10 
15 Easton, 1997; BERL, 2009, among many others.   
16 For example, Rehm et al., 2006, p. 14.  
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Collins and Lapsley include the resources expended in the production of abusively 
consumed alcoholic beverages, but this method has not been generally followed.17   
There are a number of problems in the means used to estimate actual costs which 
generally lead to inflated social cost figures. The largest cost component in most COI 
studies is productivity losses due to premature mortality and morbidity. As the Single et 
al (2003, pp. 38-42) guidelines recognise, these costs are difficult to estimate. Many 
studies – such as Rehm et al (2007), Rice et al (1991), and Rosen et al (2008) – simply 
take the difference between the average earnings of the general population and alcohol 
abusers as an indication of the lost productivity due to alcohol abuse. However, this 
approach grossly exaggerates productivity costs, first by unrealistically assuming that 
alcohol abusers would be just as productive as non-abusers but for their alcohol abuse, 
second by ignoring replacement of missing workers and thus (unrealistically) assuming 
an economy at full capacity.18 Further, distinction between private and policy-relevant 
external cost would need to be accounted for.  
Many of these costs are only partly attributable to alcohol abuse. Health problems are 
caused by many factors; counting any illness for which alcohol is a contributing factor as 
wholly attributable to alcohol abuse inflates figures. As such, most COI studies take 
estimates of the proportion of illness attributable to alcohol to get a better indication of 
the true costs of alcohol abuse (Single et al., 2003, pp. 37-38). The Single et al (2003, p. 
42) guidelines recommend a similar approach to crime, pointing out that merely being 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol does not tell us whether the crime would not have 
been committed if the perpetrator had been sober. This advice has not generally been 
heeded. Varney and Guest (2002), for example, simply take the proportion of perpetrators 
who tested positive for alcohol when committing some crime as the fraction attributable 
to alcohol. While that study could perhaps be forgiven, having been released prior to the 
Single et al guidelines, Collins & Lapsley, who coauthored the Single et al 2003 
guidelines, similarly use demonstrably non-causal measures of alcohol-related crime.19 
Transfers such as welfare payments and theft are generally (and correctly) excluded from 
measures of social cost since they reflect a shift in resources rather than a net cost to 
society. Only one COI study we are aware of, Salomaa (1995), counts welfare payments 
as a social cost. Distinguishing marginal from inframarginal effects is problematic. 
Intangible costs such as pain and suffering are also generally excluded from the standard 
COI approach due to the difficulty of measuring these costs. 
Social cost estimates are frequently compared to GDP. The comparison is spurious for 
several reasons. GDP is a measure of value added, whereas COI definitions of social cost 
are largely a toting up of costs, with offsetting economic benefits (and thus value) mostly 
ignored by assumption. Social cost estimates generally include items not counted in GDP, 
such as household work and intangible costs. Further, comparisons of stock measures of 
                                                 
17 The only other COI studies of which we are aware including the cost of consuming or producing 
alcoholic beverage are Easton, 1997; Chung et al., 2006; and BERL, 2009.  
18 See Moller and Matic, 2010. 
19 See Section 4, below. 
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social cost with flow measures of GDP can be misleading. For example, studies which 
calculate the value of lives lost due to alcohol abuse may then spuriously compare the 
value of years of life lost, a stock, to annual GDP, a flow, when the two measures are 
incommensurable. Most studies admit these problems when comparing their headline 
figures to GDP, but media coverage and political debate tends to overlook these 
subtleties. 
The innovations of Collins and Lapsley did not necessarily work to produce larger social 
cost figures. Compared to the US-PHS COI studies, the inclusion of resource costs of 
consumption and the exclusion of the private costs of non-abusive consumption roughly 
cancel each other out. Collins and Lapsley’s results do not differ sharply from earlier COI 
studies. Figure 1 graphs the reported social cost of alcohol as a percentage of GDP for 
those 25 COI studies at the national level. This shows that the headline values reported by 
Collins and Lapsley, represented by solid squares, are consistent with the findings of 
other COI studies. 
Figure 1: COI Social cost of alcohol estimates as percent of GDP20 
 
The problem with this new method, however, was that it could more easily be used as a 
basis for policy, since it is explicitly – and, we will argue, mistakenly – assumed that 
these are costs not offset by private benefits. Moreover, the Collins and Lapsley method 
is extremely sensitive to the definition of abusive consumption. When the resource costs 
of alcoholic beverages are included in the calculation, a small loosening of the definition 
of abuse can produce enormous increases in the headline social cost figure. Those studies 
following Collins and Lapsley in including the cost of beverage are shown as shaded 
circles in Figure 1.21 Two of these studies, both from New Zealand, have arrived at very 
large estimates. Easton (1997), not shown in Figure 1 to avoid unduly extending the 
vertical axis, provides an estimate about an order of magnitude higher on a per capita 
                                                 
20 Social cost measures are not usefully compared to GDP, as noted elsewhere. However, large figures 
relative to GDP may build support for regulatory or tax measures restricting alcohol use. 
21 Easton 1997; Chung et al., 2006; BERL, 2009.  
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basis than the average found in other studies. BERL (2009) produce a number which is 
much larger than other social cost studies other than Easton (1997), by considering half 
of all alcohol consumption abusive, among other unusual method decisions detailed as 
case study in Section 4, below. Figure 2, below, places the Easton (1997) result among 
the other figures. 
Figure 2: Social cost figures as percent of GDP including Easton (1997) 
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4. Antipodean lessons: The Social Costs of Alcohol in Australia 
and New Zealand 
In the previous section we examined the proliferation of studies presenting cost of illness 
(COI) estimates for alcohol as measures of costs to society. In Australia and New 
Zealand, COI studies have figured prominently in alcohol legal reform, helping to build 
public support for greater controls on alcohol. We now examine two recent examples of 
these studies: Collins and Lapsley (2008) and BERL (2009). The COI method underlying 
both studies causes their calculated cost estimates to be irrelevant for policy analysis. The 
majority of costs are properly considered internal, and those costs properly considered 
external are, at best, imperfectly measured. While the figures produced by the COI 
method are meaningless from an economic and policy perspective, they are rather large, 
appear authoritative, and consequently influence policy. We begin with Collins and 
Lapsley’s 2008 examination of the social costs of alcohol in Australia before considering 
BERL’s derivative application in New Zealand. 
4.1. Collins & Lapsley (2008) 
Collins and Lapsley (2008, henceforth CL) argue that alcohol imposed a net cost on 
Australians of $15,318,200,000 in the 2004-2005 fiscal year, consisting of $1.7 billion in 
spending on alcohol, $1.4 billion in crime costs, $2 billion in net health costs, $3.6 billion 
in lost workplace production, $1.6 billion in lost home production and $2.2 billion in road 
accidents, as well as intangible costs of $4.5 billion from loss of life, pain and suffering; 
costs jointly attributable to alcohol and other drug use total an additional billion dollars.22 
CL’s method requires that abusive consumption provide no offsetting benefit to the 
consumer. This assumption of the non-existence of private consumption benefit produces 
the majority of headline costs in CL and is without foundation or support. If offsetting 
benefits exist, then private costs borne by the heavy drinker including lost wages, lost 
productivity, poor health, increased mortality, road accident costs accruing to the drinker 
and lost home production must be weighed against consumption benefits and are properly 
accounted a private rather than a social cost.  
Given the CL definition, a private cost without offsetting benefits becomes socially 
relevant: an arithmetically defensible position. However, the existence of potential 
failures of consumer information or of rationality is sufficient for CL to entirely discount 
private benefits of “abusive” consumption; the method is without support in the economic 
literature.  
Headline figures in CL mostly depend on the presumed -existence of private benefits 
from consumption of alcohol among harmful drinkers. Extraordinary claims require 
extraordinary evidence; the burden of proof is on those who make this claim. Collins and 
Lapsley provide no supporting evidence, and little detail beyond the potential for failures 
                                                 
22 Table 33, p. 64. From this total they deduct $1.6 billion in consumption resources saved through 
premature mortality. We would discount this as generally constituting an intrafamily transfer through the 
estate rather than a real benefit. 
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of information or of rationality, to explain why consumers who derive zero gross benefit 
from consumption of alcohol, according to CL, continue to purchase it in quantity. Other 
substantial problems in CL’s estimates are of second-order importance relative to their 
complete discounting of any private benefit from either what they deem addictive 
consumption or from consumption that leads to adverse consequence. 
4.1.1. Private and Social Costs 
Private costs are properly excluded from measures of policy relevant social cost as they 
are generally offset by private consumption benefits of magnitude at least as great as 
those privately borne costs. Findings of net costs then generally imply costs imposed on 
third parties. Confusingly, CL do not use the term ‘net costs’ to refer to the excess of 
costs over benefits, including consumption benefits; instead CL refer to the total cost of 
alcohol use net of any health benefits which flow from moderate alcohol consumption. 
Consumption benefits other than those relevant to health are arbitrarily excluded by the 
CL method.  
In CL, two classes of consumers do not enjoy consumption benefits from alcohol. First, 
addicted drinkers, who consume, by “educated guess”, some thirty percent of alcohol 
consumed in Australia. CL warn this could be an underestimate. Consequently thirty 
percent of total alcohol expenditure in Australia – some $1.7 billion dollars per annum, is 
tallied as a private cost with no offsetting benefit: a social cost. Second, CL argue that 
any drinker who is imperfectly informed about alcohol’s potentially deleterious effects 
cannot be viewed as an informed consumer; CL inexplicably assert this justifies the 
elimination of all private consumption benefits for consumers suffering or imposing any 
adverse consequence of alcohol consumption. While we argue in Section 2, above, that 
weighing the deadweight costs of excess consumption resulting from information or 
rationality failures may be justifiable, assuming all consumption to provide only 
deadweight cost is not. Consumer enjoyment forms the bulk of the economic benefit 
consumers receive from the consumption of alcohol; counting these benefits as zero 
allows CL to convert private but potentially unanticipated costs of alcohol consumption 
into policy-relevant social costs. 
Even were we to abandon mainstream welfare economics by deeming all imperfectly 
informed consumption as generating only cost, we still could not conclude that alcohol 
use imposed particular harm unless failures in information were greater for alcohol use 
than for average alternative consumption goods. Every consumption decision made by 
each and every consumer, always and everywhere, for every product, is characterized by 
imperfect information. It would be an interesting exercise to derive welfare conditions 
under the assumption that consumption under imperfect information cannot provide 
consumption benefits. 
This elimination of benefits for both “addicted” and imperfectly informed consumers is 
responsible for most of the CL headline cost figure but is both implausible and without 
foundation in economics. A measure of social costs has no policy implications if that 
measure is not based on sound economic method: standard welfare economics allows us 
to conclude that Pigouvian solutions may be useful when action imposes high social cost; 
if the social cost estimate is derived outside of the method of standard welfare economics, 
it cannot draw on welfare economics for its policy implications. 
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The omission of alcohol’s non-health consumption benefits from the CL estimate 
provides important context for the “net” cost figure produced. Pointed at virtually any 
activity, an application of the CL method which counts costs but ignores most or all 
benefits would find large net costs. Where individuals voluntarily bear risk in exchange 
for consumption benefits, counting the costs of the relatively few tragedies without 
weighing the consumption benefits enjoyed by the majority of consumers gives no 
indication of value. CL correctly assert that limits on consumer knowledge and rationality 
means they are unable to correctly anticipate an activity’s costs, but then incorrectly 
argue this justifies eliminating nearly all benefits from the analysis. This is plainly non-
sequitur. We explain in section 2 how economists incorporate real world imperfections in 
consumer rationality and information into consumer welfare analysis. 
By eliminating most of an activity’s benefits, CL ceases to be a test of any hypothesis; it 
is trivially the sum of an activity’s production, distribution and consumption costs, net of 
a small and arbitrary collection of benefits. The CL measure is unrelated in any 
systematic way to an activity’s contribution to welfare (its value to society, or efficiency) 
or its contribution, positive or negative, to GDP. Policy makers can therefore have no use 
for it. The repeated use of the CL estimate by politicians in support of policy suggests 
they have misunderstood the CL headline figure to be a measure of contribution to GDP 
or to social welfare. It is not. 
By way of analogy, consider the case of skiing. Every skier bears risk; a very small 
proportion of skiers are killed. If we were to consider the net costs of those skiers 
involved in a serious accident, we would be right, to a first approximation, to ignore the 
benefits of skiing for those victims of accidents, since any benefits would be trivially 
small relative to the magnitude of the costs they incurred. However, it would be wrong to 
conclude from this examination of victims that skiing imposed massive net social costs. 
No estimate of any activity’s value, and no policy implications, can be derived from an 
assessment limited to the downside risk of an activity. The benefits of alcohol 
consumption enjoyed by those drinkers who ex ante consumed as much alcohol must be 
weighed against the harms borne by those who become alcoholics or suffered another 
adverse consequence. Only in this way is it possible to make economically meaningful 
statements about net costs, whether of alcohol consumption or of any other activity. 
4.1.2. Incorporating consumer imperfections 
Alcoholics may wish that they had never touched alcohol. Analytically, this argues for an 
excess of private costs over private benefits: for these drinkers; their consumption of 
alcohol exceeded, perhaps by some margin, an optimum. The difference between the cost 
and benefit may be labeled regret, but regret does not imply the non-existence of benefits. 
Consider an alcoholic who consumes ten standard drinks per day on average and who, by 
assumption, would be happier if he could consume zero drinks per day, but who would be 
happier still if he could consume no more than four standard drinks per day were he able 
to stop after the fourth drink. In this example, the first four drinks consumed provide 
benefits in excess of their costs. The latter six drinks consumed provide costs in excess of 
their benefits. The excess costs of the latter six drinks in the example outweigh the 
benefits of the first four, leading the drinker to wish he consumed no drinks at all. CL err 
in counting the entire amount consumed as representing pure cost; costs net of benefits 
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will be rather less than gross costs. It does not follow that if for some drinkers the costs of 
drinking outweigh benefits, there are no benefits.  
CL err in deeming all alcoholics’ expenditures on alcohol a social cost rather than a 
private cost. If total private costs to the alcoholic exceeded private benefits, net cost is 
relevant in a total cost-benefit analysis, and would be correctly weighed against the 
benefits enjoyed by moderate drinkers who took similar risks of developing alcoholism. 
Policy is not informed by an economic cost measure that counts only downside costs and 
excludes upside benefits. 
4.1.3. Mistreatment of rationality, information 
The central role assigned to rationality in CL goes back at least to Single, Collins et al 
(2003), who suggest that while private costs falling on the individual consumer typically 
ought not to be counted in cost estimation studies, these costs can only be discounted 
where we expect there to be offsetting private benefits.  Single, Collins et al correctly 
acknowledge that for rational consumers, personal costs cannot exceed personal benefits 
and so private costs are not social costs.  But what is necessary to establish private 
benefits in excess of costs?  According to Single, Collins et al (p. 21): 
Thus, if the costs of substance use are to be classified as private costs, the following three 
conditions must be simultaneously satisfied: 
1. The users are fully informed as to the costs which the substance use imposes upon 
themselves; 
2. The users are required to bear the full (internal and external) costs of the 
consumption; and 
3. The users make rational consumption decisions in the light of all the information 
available to them. 
These requirements are extremely stringent, so stringent in fact that the conventional 
approach of treating all abuse costs as social costs is fully justified. 
CL follow a similar approach, arguing that if consumers are not fully informed, 
consistently rational, and required to bear the full costs of their consumption, the 
“resultant costs” are social.23 CL concede the weakness of rationality as a test, noting in 
effect the impossibility of separating rational optimisation of different objectives from 
irrationality, and falling back to a position that “society is clearly unwilling to accept all 
behaviour patterns” (p. 10).  
Despite the central role assigned to rationality and full information in the CL method, 
neither term is formally defined. The test for private costs defined by Single, Collins et al 
is unknown to the economics literature, and for good reason: the stringent nature of the 
                                                 
23 See page 9. CL further argue, “Being fully informed about the private costs of abuse requires the abuser 
to have access to, and have the ability to process and evaluate, epidemiological information on the effects 
of drug use. It also requires the drug user to be able to evaluate the probable future health and other costs 
resulting from the drug use. It is difficult to believe that drug users, by their nature, are fully-informed, or 
even well-informed, about the costs of their abuse.”  Contrast Collins and Lapsley, here, with Lundborg 
and Lindgren’s 2002 finding that youths overestimate the probability of developing alcoholism. 
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test for private cost renders it trivial. Consumer imperfections in information and 
rationality must be presumed everywhere, and so the Single, Collins et al private cost 
definition must convert the private costs of all goods to social costs. By converting 
private costs to social, the implied view is that even minor imperfections in consumer 
rationality or information eliminate all private consumption benefits. This is the 
cornerstone assumption of the CL method. 
In short, the literature following Single, Collins et al. incorrectly considers the First 
Welfare Theorem as consisting of necessary rather than of sufficient conditions for 
optimality, then assumes that any deviation from those conditions justifies treating all 
individual choice as completely in error. This does not merely stray widely from 
established theory; rather, it is a position that calls us to discard modern welfare theory. It 
is a position best argued and formally proved in the literature on market failure and 
welfare economics before being assumed in a consultancy report. 
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics outlines conditions sufficient for 
market efficiency. If one or more of the assumptions underlying the theorem fail, 
government action may correct market failure.  Efficient outcomes can be achieved even 
when the theorem’s axioms fail to obtain. The theorem assumes, for example, an infinite 
number of infinitesimally small trading agents, none of whom can affect prices. While 
this clearly fails to hold in the real world, and fails even more strongly in laboratory 
environments with small numbers of traders, traders in experimental double auction 
environments nevertheless often find the efficient solution.24 
The Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem suggests market failure will be pervasive because 
problems of information asymmetry are ubiquitous; despite the welfare theorem’s 
conditions being sufficient rather than necessary, markets may well typically fail to 
exhibit perfect blackboard efficiency. While it would be surprising if alcohol markets 
were immune to such failures, it does not follow from the existence of imperfections that 
all private costs are made social. Even if the First Welfare Theorem stated necessary 
rather than sufficient conditions for an efficient equilibrium and one of those conditions 
failed to obtain, that would only tell us that interventions designed to address the specific 
failure may be justified and that some deadweight loss would be present as consequence 
of the failure.25  
Information failures and self-control problems may lead to greater than optimal 
consumption and may consequently result in net or excess costs associated with the 
erroneous increment of consumption. Such failures result in incurring of costs in excess 
of benefits at the margin, and not the elimination of all benefits.  
                                                 
24 Vernon Smith summarizes the literature in his Nobel lecture, “Constructivist and Ecological Rationality 
in Economics”, American Economic Review (2003). See discussion at p.475. 
25 Consider the absurdity by analogy to physics. Earth’s gravity provides an accelerative force of 9.8 meters 
per second squared; an object in a vacuum if dropped will accelerate at that rate. We would err grievously 
if we then concluded that deviations in acceleration under gravity due to air resistance on earth meant 
gravity could be ignored entirely. CL effectively assume as much when asserting that the existence of 
market failures transforms all private alcohol abuse costs into social costs. 
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CL engage in sophistry when arguing that when consumers are less than fully informed 
or less than consistently rational, the resultant costs are social. If “resultant costs” meant 
the excess of total costs over total benefits for those units of production erroneously 
consumed, the method would be defensible. But it is not what CL have done. Instead, 
they have counted as pure cost the total amount that addicted consumers spend on alcohol 
and have added to that all of the experienced downside costs of those suffering adverse 
consequences from alcohol consumption while weighing none of the private benefits. 
CL’s treatment of all abuse costs as social only can be supported in the case in which the 
optimal quantity of consumption was really zero. In that case and that case alone is the 
increment of excess consumption equal to total consumption. 
The expansive approach in counting private costs as social is methodologically unsound 
but allows CL to assume away an otherwise intractable problem: setting a threshold level 
of rational consumption. Sound method would require estimating what portion of 
consumption was erroneously consumed as consequence of particular failures of 
information or rationality and the excess of private cost over private benefit for that 
portion of consumption. But how can we tell for any drinker whether his sixth drink was 
rationally or irrationally consumed? 
It is tempting to use an epidemiological standard based on levels of consumption that are 
consistent with harms to health (see BERL, 2009, discussed below). However, rational 
individuals can and do choose to trade off health maximization against other goals. 
Common experience suggests health and life expectancy are constantly traded off against 
other worthy goals of enjoyment, experience and life quality consistent with a rational 
expression of preferences. An epidemiological consumption threshold does not test 
rationality unless it can be established that individuals have selected health as their only 
goal; in that case, we would also have cause to worry about underconsumption by 
teetotalers.  
4.1.4. Rational Addiction 
A subset of abusive consumers of alcohol are addicted. Becker and Murphy (1988) define 
addiction as rational if consumption maximises forward-looking utility under stable 
preferences. A good is potentially addictive in the Becker-Murphy framework if there is 
complementarity between past and current consumption. Becker-Murphy predict that if 
addiction is rational, addicts will respond to permanent future price increases by reducing 
consumption today. Becker, Murphy and Grossman (1994), among others, find evidence 
consistent with rational addiction. 
None of the discussion in the previous section demands that abusive consumption, let 
alone addiction, be rational. Even where consumption is irrational and produces 
undesired consequences, the consumption remains of some positive value and the 
analysis above holds. CL dismiss Becker and Murphy 1988 by arguing that the Becker-
Murphy model has unrealistic axiomatic assumptions including rationality and 
information, and so it cannot hold in the real world.26 However, at least since Friedman 
                                                 
26 CL argue further at page 10 that “A high proportion of addictions are acquired in the early- or mid-teens 
when it would seem that the presence of both rationality and full information is unlikely.” They present no 
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(1956), the economics profession has tended to focus on whether a model accurately 
predicts real world behaviour than on whether its assumptions perfectly reflect reality. 
The specific predictions of the model regarding addicted consumers’ responses to 
expected future price changes bear out in the real world. 
The rational addiction model does not presume addicted drinkers are rational. Instead it 
describes what rational, fully informed consumers would do when faced with addictive 
consumption choices and subsequently in response to price changes. Becker and Murphy 
show that addictive consumption is not incompatible with fully informed and fully 
rational decision-making. A series of empirical studies largely confirm their model. 
Consequently, evidence of addiction, let alone the much lower threshold of consumption 
in excess of an epidemiological threshold, is an insufficient basis to conclude that the 
consumption is irrational.  
The CL objection to rational addiction is misguided in other ways. First, it is common 
ground among economists that consumers make mistakes in reasoning: empirical 
estimates of the rational addiction model only find about 75% of consumer behaviour is 
consistent with rational addiction (see Murphy 2009). Second, differences of opinion 
regarding the existence and degree of rationality among consumers are second order: it is 
the incorrect incorporation of irrationality into a model of welfare by CL that is mainly 
responsible for the inflation of their headline figure and its disconnection with any 
policy-relevant economic statistic. Third, CL do not consider how abandoning rationality 
in measuring the cost of abusive consumption has consequences for consumer responses 
to policy. Fourth, if consumption is irrational then economic measures including cost 
cease to have meaning.27 
CL follow the COI method recommended by Single, Collins et al that deems a broad 
assortment of private costs as having no offsetting benefit due to information or 
rationality-based market failures and consequently being of policy interest. This method 
is inconsistent with mainstream economic understanding of the distinction between 
private and social cost and of mainstream market failure theory. Even if it were 
established that consumption were irrational, it does not follow that the private (gross, not 
net) benefit of consumption is zero and all private costs, including the production of 
alcohol, are made social. The alleged market failures are without strong foundation, but 
even if granted, could justify inclusion of only a small percentage of the social cost 
claimed by CL. 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence for the claim. And what evidence we have runs contrary. Lundborg and Lindgren (2002) find that 
people on average overestimate the likelihood of becoming an alcoholic and that youths in particular 
overestimate that likelihood.  
27 Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) remind us that the “use of welfare analysis requires the standard definition 
of economic welfare” where the standard definition of welfare depends on choices made by presumably 
largely rational consumers. Outside of that framework, we have little basis for welfare comparisons across 
policy or world states. See also Seamus Hogan, “A word after the final word on rationality,” available from 
http://offsettingbehaviour.blogspot.com/2009/07/word-after-final-word-on-rationality.html (accessed 15 
June 2011). In the world in which individuals cannot reliably identify costs or benefits of their actions, 
cost-benefit analyses are ultimately futile; every market will be out of equilibrium and no price will 
represent marginal cost or marginal utility.  
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Private costs form a high proportion of Collins and Lapsley’s tabulated social costs of 
alcohol use. In the following sections we consider the main cost components estimated by 
CL as they move from most plausibly private to most plausibly social. While we provide 
indicative figures suggesting the proportion of Collins & Lapsley’s cited figures that 
could potentially represent actual social costs, the derived figures are not a reliable 
measure of the social costs of alcohol in Australia.28 Instead, they are only suggestive of 
what CL might have found had they followed a more standard method in conducting their 
assessment.  
4.1.5. Resources used in abusive consumption 
It is difficult to consider the amount heavy drinkers spend on their alcohol as an external 
policy relevant cost. CL include some $1.7 billion they assume is spent by heavy drinkers 
as a social cost of alcohol. Some fraction of this figure could be considered as socially 
relevant where a portion of consumption was made in error, whether due to addiction or 
to imperfect information about the health risks of alcohol. But the figure provided has no 
such basis. Instead, they cite prior work (CL 1996) as having concluded that twenty 
percent of alcohol consumption was by addicted drinkers and consequently was without 
offsetting benefit; they add, as an “educated guess” and without empirical support beyond 
that some others say the fraction is higher, that an additional ten percent of consumed 
alcohol is also without value because it is consumed by people who go on to suffer or 
inflict adverse consequences. As these estimates are of no small importance to the 
headline cost estimate in CL, consider the support for the finding that twenty percent of 
alcohol is consumed for no benefit, as reported in Collins and Lapsley (1996): 
The 1993 National Drug Strategy household survey found that 10% of alcohol drinkers 
consumed alcohol every day. All addicted consumers of alcohol could be expected to 
consume alcohol every day, although not all daily drinkers will be addicted. It can be 
expected that addicted drinkers will on average consume a very high amount of alcohol 
compared with the rest of the alcohol consuming population. On the basis of this analysis 
it was concluded that 20% of alcohol consumption was by addicted consumers.  
This estimate was supported by advice from drug experts with qualifications in medicine, 
epidemiology and behavioural sciences.” (found at 3.(h))  
Collins and Lapsley (1996) is the only support for CL’s contention that some thirty 
percent of alcohol is consumed without benefit by addicts. We would expect the most 
important empirical assumption in CL to be better supported. BERL (2009), discussed 
below, provide a similarly robust basis for their measure of harmful consumption. 
Including the entire amount is invalid unless it is the case that there is zero gross private 
benefit from any amount of that alcohol consumption. It is plausible that many addicted 
drinkers would wish to drink less; it is implausible that they receive zero gross benefit 
from any portion of their consumption. In the absence of detailed work showing the 
proportion of addictive consumption that imposes costs on the drinker not only in excess 
of benefits for those extramarginal units but also of sufficient magnitude to outweigh 
consumer surplus enjoyed on prior units of consumption, the best approach is to consider 
                                                 
28 Crime costs in particular are imperfectly measured. 
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this an internal rather than an external cost of alcohol consumption, and therefore policy 
irrelevant.29 
4.1.6. Intangible costs 
Loss of life due to premature mortality contributes $4.1 billion in annual intangible cost, 
including $565 million loss of life costs accruing to road accidents; pain and suffering 
due to road accidents totals an additional $0.4 billion. Where the loss of life or accident 
cost accrues to the drinker himself, the cost is best viewed as internal. Costs imposed on 
victims of alcohol-related crime including victims of drink drivers external to the driver’s 
vehicle are rightly deemed external and policy-relevant.  
But even in the case of drink driving, where we would expect the greatest proportion of 
external harms, the vast majority of cost accrues to the driver himself and to passengers 
within his vehicle. American data suggests over eighty percent of drink driving fatalities 
involve those within the drink-driver’s vehicle.30 Counting only the minority of total 
intangible costs falling on parties properly considered external reduces total intangible 
costs from $4.5 billion to $184 million.31 
We worry that CL’s inclusion of intangible costs from loss of life constitutes double 
counting where value of forgone production is counted as a tangible cost of premature 
mortality. CL’s value of a lost life year, $53,267, is derived from the Australian Bureau 
of Transport Economics’ (2000) estimation of the valuation of a statistical life; that 
measure is based on estimates from willingness-to-pay measures.32 But surely one’s 
willingness to pay for incremental safety improvements, the basis for such value-of-
statistical-life measures, incorporates not only the intangible costs of death but also the 
forgone enjoyment of consumption that would come with forgone wages.  
                                                 
29 Defenders of COI method have alleged that the suggested approach presumes perfect rationality and/or 
information (for example see BERL’s defence of their study “BERL rejects criticism of study,” available 
from: http://www.berl.co.nz/1026a1.page, accessed 21 June 2011). It does not. We presume only that 
where consumption is to excess, causing costs in excess of benefits at the margin, those excess costs are on 
average offset by benefits in excess of costs from the first few drinks. This, we argue, is a better 
approximation than to presume zero gross benefits for any drinking, including the first few, by an abusive 
drinker. This approach plainly does not depend on perfect rationality and/or information, since in the 
example drinking is, by assumption, to excess. We require only that gross benefits exist against which 
excess costs can be offset. 
30 Stringham and Moore (2009) cite NHSTA data showing 83% of drink driving related fatalities accrue to 
individuals within the drink-driver’s vehicle. 
31 An alternative accounting which would count the costs accruing to the drink driver’s passengers but not 
to the drink driver himself is potentially defensible, though it would need to overcome the strong 
presumption of a contractual nexus linking driver and passenger. While we have statistics sufficient for 
estimating the proportion of victims external to the vehicle, we do not know the proportion consisting of 
drink drivers. As the total cost associated with drink driving loss of life is just over half a billion dollars, 
even including all such victims’ costs as policy relevant would have only moderate effects on the overall 
cost figure tabulated. 
32 While the Bureau of Transport’s crash cost accounting uses a fatality value derived from a human capital 
approach, they also list what they deem a plausible VSL value based on willingness-to-pay measures; it is 
this latter figure that CL use. 
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Consequently, and as will be discussed in greater depth below, measures of forgone 
production will only include those costs not already counted in measures of external 
intangible costs of lives lost. 
4.1.7. Productivity and absenteeism 
Lost earnings due to premature mortality, premature retirement and absenteeism are costs 
that accrue primarily to the drinker but constitute over $3.5 billion of CL’s headline 
social costs. While CL argue that employees shift costs onto the employer, making those 
costs external, the argument fails. Employer and employee are bound by a contractual 
nexus; the worker’s reduced productivity is internal to his relationship with his employer. 
A less productive employee is less likely to receive future promotions and salary 
increases; he bears the burden of his reduced productivity. Firms that fail to detect worker 
productivity and promote workers beyond their worth will eventually go under. 
Measurement concerns are relevant. The method used by CL to assess excess 
absenteeism may be unsound due to uncontrolled confounding. CL compare the number 
of absences from work for drinkers and non-drinkers, presumably controlling for age and 
sex. But if it is the case that the employee who calls in sick due to a hangover is more 
likely to be irresponsible on other unmeasured margins, then comparing the mean 
absenteeism rate difference between the two groups and attributing the entire difference 
to excess alcohol use seems rather too quick. Equally plausible would then be that the 
kinds of employees who call in sick due to hangovers are also the kinds of employees 
who call in sick for other discretionary reasons. But we cannot conclude this without 
more detail of CL’s method than they provide. 
Further, there remains the “alcohol-income puzzle”: Auld (2005) finds that moderate 
drinkers earn ten percent more than abstainers while heavy drinkers earn twelve percent 
more than abstainers.33 If drinkers on average impose high costs on employers, it seems 
odd that employers should choose to pay them more than teetotalers.  
Only where workforce reduction and absenteeism are imposed on a third party by a 
drinker, as would be the case when a drink driver kills someone outside the vehicle, could 
we consider the cost of lost earnings as an external cost – primarily borne by the family 
of the harmed party rather than by his employer. And in those cases, as noted above, if 
the intangible costs of lives lost have already been counted, including forgone production 
constitutes double-counting where workers earn their marginal product. 
Similarly, the $1.6 billion in forgone household production due to premature mortality 
and illness can only count as external when the costs are borne by an external third party; 
this would be a very small proportion of the cost figure. But even leaving that aside, the 
measure seems dubious. CL follow the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimate of 
individual function replacement cost: they tally the time individuals spend on all forms of 
household production, then estimate the cost of hiring someone at hourly rates to perform 
each of those tasks. The ABS found that it would have cost an amount equivalent to 
                                                 
33 Auld controls for potential endogeneity and a host of potential confounding factors, finding that the 
alcohol-income puzzle remains even subsequent to such controls. See also Chatterji and DeSimone (2006), 
who find that binge drinking in high school correlates with higher wages in adulthood. 
 25
roughly half of Australian GDP to hire workers to perform all the tasks typically 
conducted within households.34 But many household production tasks cease to be of any 
value at all if the performer of those tasks suffers premature mortality; we need not hire a 
chef to replace the cooking duties performed by a regrettably deceased bachelor. Further, 
the fact that tasks were performed within the household rather than outsourced to the 
market suggests that the household was not willing to pay the market rate for that 
service’s production; pricing at market replacement cost may overestimate the value of 
the service performed. And, finally, the measure will already have been included in the 
value of the statistical life lost. 
Collins and Lapsley net from this measure the value of consumption resources freed for 
others’ use with a premature death: the “value of national resources which would have 
been consumed had the drug-attributable death not occurred.” They provide no hint as to 
the workings underlying their figure of $1.6 billion in consumption released for the use of 
others. Collins and Lapsley (1991) note the following: 
“In estimating the tangible costs of mortality we have subtracted consumption from 
production to indicate the net tangible resources removed from the rest of society 
(including the deceased) as a result of the drug abuse death. It is generally agreed in the 
literature (see, for example, Motha 1990) that, if the viewpoint of the study were that of 
the whole community, it is not appropriate to subtract consumption from production. We 
accept this analysis and accommodate it within our framework of tangible and intangible 
costs. 
Had the prematurely dead been still alive they would have been consuming a certain 
value of goods and services. A minimum value of these goods and services is indicated by 
their market value since had the prematurely dead not valued them, as a minimum, 
market prices they would not have been willing to pay these prices. The market value of 
consumption forgone by the deceased presents a minimum estimate of the benefit of 
forgone consumption.”(p. 60, 1991) 
In the 2008 study, CL weigh $1.6 billion in forgone consumption against $3.2 billion in 
forgone production due to premature mortality. This presents a bit of a puzzle: what 
happens to the half of a worker’s product not consumed by a deceased worker? If the 
country were populated exclusively by households with a single earner, and consumption 
were split equally across couples, and if only the earning member of the household ever 
died prematurely due to alcohol use, forgone consumption totaling roughly half of 
forgone production would make sense. But that does not describe Australia in 2004/5.  
We must turn to the construction of the “forgone production” figure to resolve the 
discrepancy. CL write: 
To estimate the workforce impact of drug abuse on costs as defined here, the size of the 
actual workforce in the financial year 2004/05 is compared with the workforce size 
estimated on the assumption that there had been no past or present abuse of the drug in 
question. An estimate is then made, from national accounts data, of the difference in 
potential production levels between the actual workforce and the counterfactual, no drug 
abuse, workforce. (p. 24) 
                                                 
34 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1997. “Unpaid Work and the Australian Economy”. 
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Collins and Lapsley effectively take a measure of per capita GDP and multiply it by 
missing workers to tally the cost of forgone production.  
We do not agree with the approach that takes forgone production as constituting a 
relevant external cost. If workers are paid their marginal product, production losses are 
entirely internalized. Further, worker and employee are linked by contractual nexus that 
internalizes effects. Finally, forgone tax revenues to the government will be matched by 
reduced expenditures on superannuation and other benefits; only in the case where 
deceased drinkers are disproportionately drawn from the segment of the population 
contributing more in taxation than they consume in services costly at the margin could a 
plausible case be based on forgone net tax revenues. 
But even were this cost not internalized by contract between workers and employers or 
by that workers are paid their marginal product, such a measure may overestimate even 
gross production costs if there remains any potential that employers can replace a missing 
worker with either another worker or a more capital-intensive production process. 
Without endorsing the approach taken, we note that the WHO’s current “Best Practice” 
guidelines (Moller and Matic, 2010) warn that even those inclined to take forgone 
production as an external cost overestimate those costs: 
By the late 1990s, it was becoming clear that the human capital method was based on a 
highly dubious assumption: that a society is characterized by full employment, such that 
people who die are absolutely irreplaceable in the labour market (Koopmanschap, 1998; 
Maynard, Godfrey & Hardman, 1994). This assumption is a clear overstatement as it is 
more likely that some of the working people who die prematurely are replaced by people 
who otherwise would have been unemployed. If we go so far as to assume that everyone 
in the workforce who died prematurely would be replaced, then the only cost is the 
friction cost of replacing workers, which primarily consists of the time it takes to recruit 
a new worker (Koopmanschap et al., 1995). Several studies have compared the human 
capital and friction cost methods, finding that the friction cost is often just 1–3% of the 
human capital estimate (Danish Ministry of Health, 1999; Rehm et al., 2006) and thereby 
demonstrating just how important such assumptions are.35  
The human capital approach noted takes the present discounted value of expected future 
earnings in a counterfactual; Collins and Lapsley’s method, the demographic approach, 
counts the annual flow of forgone earnings against a counterfactual population including 
those deceased in this and prior years. But the frictional method clearly remains a fraction 
rather than a multiple of annual forgone wages. Moller and Matic go on to recommend 
some measure between frictional costs and forgone wages; forgone GDP per capita is 
well beyond Moller and Matic’s upper bound. Even within the framework to which we 
raise objection, per capita GDP as production cost of forgone workers, socially borne, 
requires rather strong assumptions regarding worker irreplaceability. Our figures rely on 
the external rather than the internal critique. 
Finally, we need account for that the bulk of the costs of forgone production will already 
have been accounted for in the intangible value of statistical lives lost. The Australian 
Bureau of Transport Economics’ value of a statistical life (VSL), which CL use to derive 
                                                 
35 Moller and Matic, 2010, p. 32.  
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their cost of a life-year lost, is based on willingness to pay for incremental safety 
improvements. This leads to two absurdities. First, VSL measures are derived on the 
basis of individuals’ willingness to bear risk. Going on to count as public cost the value 
of lives lost by those who have chosen to accept those risks does some violence to the 
method on which VSL measures are based: if individuals are irrational in their 
assessment of risk and unable to make informed choices about health risks, the method 
used to value statistical lives is also unsound. If the measure is sound but the costs are 
deemed public, we need a theory allowing us to claim that individuals’ assessments of 
risks on margins other than alcohol are informed and sound while those relating to 
alcohol are irrational. Second, and more critically, we cannot simultaneously count the 
costs of forgone production borne by the drinker and the value of statistical life years lost 
by drinkers as the latter value will encompass the former.  
We consequently modify the CL figure rather substantially. For both drinkers suffering 
consequences of long term alcoholism and those who are the tragic victims of drink 
drivers, workers earning their marginal product see no losses in production beyond those 
already accounted for in measures of value of life lost. The remaining external cost not 
already here counted is the frictional cost imposed on employers by workforce reduction 
and absenteeism. We use the CL estimate of forgone consumption as the true measure of 
lost wages: $1.61 billion; CL’s measure of $3.21 billion in forgone production requires 
that workers earn substantially less than their marginal product. Ten percent of that 
measure of forgone earnings is a maximal plausible estimate of costs drinkers may 
impose on employers that are not already accounted for via wage differentials: $161 
million.  
If the wage component of forgone production due to absenteeism follows that due to 
reduction in workforce and workers are paid their marginal product, forgone wages due 
to absenteeism are $184.6 million - some 50.2% of CL’s measure of forgone production. 
We take ten percent of that figure as a maximum plausible upper bound on the frictional 
costs that can be imposed on an employer that are not incorporated into wages: $18.5 
million. The measure of total net labour cost consequently drops from $3.5 billion to 
$179.6 million. 
4.1.8. Road accident costs 
Road crash costs not already tallied form the next largest plausible external cost of 
alcohol abuse. Drink drivers impose large, real, and tragic costs on others. However, we 
confess some puzzlement over CL’s figures. At Table 31, “Drug-attributable road 
accident costs”, CL list $2.2b in tangible costs of road accidents but only $1.33b are 
deemed not elsewhere included; at Table 33 which sums all the tangible social costs of 
drug abuse, tangible road accident costs not elsewhere included are listed as $2.2b. We 
suspect that CL carried over the incorrect line from their spreadsheets as other measures 
otherwise become irreconcilable.36 We here work from costs tallied in Table 31 and 
which we expect to constitute those not elsewhere included.37 
                                                 
36 CL write: “It should be noted that, in the overall output tables presented later, some of the road accident 
cost components above are included in other broader cost categories (for example, health or productivity). 
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If we continue to assume that some twenty percent of road accident victims are external 
to the drink driver’s vehicle, then we can allocate approximately twenty percent of 
property damage costs of $821.6m, and of lost quality of life due to injuries of $353.6m, 
as being external and policy relevant, along with the totality of travel delay, insurance 
administration, and policing costs. Road accident costs not elsewhere included then total 
$740 million rather than $1.68 billion.  
But we question CL’s determination of alcohol attributable accidents. Data from the 
Australian Institute of Criminology suggests that a very high proportion of those arrested 
for drink-driving had other drugs in their systems when blood testing was conducted. 
Aggregate statistics are not there presented, but details by policing region are instructive. 
67% of males arrested in Adelaide for drink driving tested positive for cannabis use, in 
Brisbane, 56%.38 While drivers under the influence of marijuana alone are less likely to 
be involved in car accidents than are those under the influence of alcohol alone, the 
combination of alcohol and marijuana seems particularly noxious: the marijuana user’s 
impairment is combined with the alcohol user’s overconfidence.39  
Recall that the aetiologic attributable fraction denotes the proportion of deaths among 
those exposed to the risk factor that are attributable to the factor in question. The alcohol 
attributable aetiologic fraction for alcoholic liver cirrhosis is 1.0 – all alcoholic liver 
cirrhosis is held to be due to alcohol consumption40. But CL’s aetiologic attributable 
fraction for illicit drug-caused deaths through road accidents for males does not exceed 
0.055 for males in any age category while reaching 0.394 for alcohol for males aged 20 to 
50. Collins and Lapsley attribute almost forty percent of all male road accident deaths in 
particular age categories to alcohol and only some five percent to other drugs despite that 
pluralities and often majorities of those arrested for drink-driving are also found to be 
under the influence of other drugs. Attributing causality when an impaired driver had 
consumed multiple substances that separately and in combination would affect driving 
ability would be rather difficult. But the attribution seems disproportionate. A reasonable 
proportion of the $740 million we here accrue to alcohol could as plausibly be attributed 
to other drug consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                 
The totals above which are designated “n.e.i.” are the ones carried over to the aggregate tables.” (p. 61). 
However, Table 31 includes $1,329.6 million in tangible costs not included elsewhere; Table 33 lists those 
costs as $2,202.0 million, the amount listed in Table 31 as total tangible costs. 
37 CL do not list which Table 31 costs are not elsewhere included. We square the measures by deeming not 
elsewhere included $821.6 million in vehicle costs; $496.8 million in travel delays and other general costs; 
$353.6 million in lost quality of life due to accidents; $10.6 million in costs of long term care and $0.6 
million for premature funerals; our total n.e.i. then matches CL’s. 
38 Australian Institute of Criminology. “Drug use monitoring in Australia: 2005 annual report on drug use 
among police detainees.” 
39  UK Department for Transport (2000) reviews the literature, finding that the impairment effect of alcohol 
is greater than cannabis but “the combined effect of both drugs was greater than any single drug alone.”  
40 Hepatitis C can also result in liver cirrhosis; presumably the aetiological fractions used have accurately 
separated hepatitis-related cirrhosis from alcohol-related cirrhosis. 
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4.1.9. Crime costs 
Alcohol-related crime provides the most plausible source of truly external social costs. 
Collins and Lapsley argue alcohol-related crime costs reach over $1.4 billion. While they 
present the figures as a lower bound on possible costs, there are strong reasons to believe 
them to be overestimates. 
Almost a quarter of tallied crime costs consist of prisoners’ forgone earnings. Had an 
individual not been arrested for alcohol-related crime, he could have been part of the 
workforce. Such losses, in an economic costing, are properly viewed as internally borne 
by the prisoner and consequently not social in nature. Further, if the assessment of 
prisoners’ productivity is conditioned only on age and sex, the measure will strongly 
overestimate prisoner earnings; labour market characteristics of the incarcerated 
generally are rather worse than those not incarcerated, even prior to incarceration.41 We 
assess forgone prisoner earnings as being entirely internal to the drinker. 
The largest component of crime costs involve police expenditures estimated at some three 
quarters of a billion dollars. These costs are estimated from surveys of those detained by 
police and published in their annual report, “Drug Use Monitoring in Australia” (DUMA, 
henceforth). Those detained in police stations are asked whether they have had five or 
more (three or more for women) drinks on the same day in the last twelve months. A 
standard drink is ten grams of alcohol, so the consumption threshold is under three 
Imperial pints of beer for a man and less than two pints for a woman; it is then 
unsurprising that in the 2005 survey used by Collins and Lapsley, 70% of men and 66% 
of women agreed that they had consumed at least that much on one occasion in the past 
year. Those answering yes were then asked if they had consumed that much alcohol any 
time during the last thirty days; 56% of men and 50% of women agreed. Then, those 
answering yes were asked whether they had consumed any alcohol at all in the last 48 
hours – 44% of men and 32% of women.42 Finally, arrestees in this group were asked six 
questions assessing alcohol dependence: “yes” answers to three or more questions 
indicated alcohol dependence.43  
Collins and Lapsley’s alcohol-attributable policing and court cost fractions derive from 
the proportion of police detainees who reported having consumed any alcohol at all in the 
                                                 
41 Giles and Le (2007) find that only 18% of a sample of Western Australian prisoners were employed in 
high skilled occupations and only 44% of those in the labour force were employed four weeks prior to 
incarceration despite overall employment rates of 93%. Assuming prisoners would have had labour force 
characteristics identical to the population average but for alcohol-induced incarceration seems mildly 
heroic. 
42 Seventy percent of this final group also tested positive for other drug use. 
43 Milner, Mouzos and Makkai, 2004. The six questions are (“during the past 12 months” is included in 
each question):  
“Have you spent more time drinking alcohol or using drugs than intended?” 
“Have you neglected some of your usual responsibilities because of using alcohol or drugs?” 
“Have you wanted to cut down on your drinking alcohol or drug use?” 
“Has anyone objected to your drinking alcohol or drug use?” 
“Have you frequently found yourself thinking about drinking alcohol or using drugs?” 
“Have you used alcohol or drugs to relieve feelings such as unhappiness, anger or boredom?”  
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prior 48 hours and who answered “yes” to three or more of the questions listed in the 
footnote below. This is clearly inadequate for assessing causality. Consider a couple 
arrested together. They had shared a bottle of wine (eight standard drinks, of which he 
consumed five) one evening two weeks earlier and had each had a glass of wine with 
dinner before going out to rob a jewelry store. If they agreed that they wanted to cut 
down their drinking, that they frequently found themselves thinking about drinking 
alcohol, and that someone had objected to their drinking in the past year, the jewelry heist 
would be an alcohol-attributed crime for assessing the proportion of policing costs for 
which alcohol is to blame. Conversely, someone who smashed up shop windows the first 
time he consumed alcohol and whose offending was entirely due to alcohol would likely 
fail to answer “yes” to three or more of the alcohol dependence survey questions.  
Prison costs are assessed by a different survey, the “Drug Use Careers of Offenders”, or 
DUCO. Here, prisoner self-reports of intoxication at the time of offending are used rather 
than simply whether the offender had consumed any alcohol in the forty-eight hours prior 
to arrest. Twenty-one percent reported being drunk on alcohol alone at the time of their 
offending (17% drunk and high). Ten percent reported alcohol (a further 8% alcohol and 
other drugs) as being responsible for their offending. This was adjusted downwards 
somewhat in models that accounted for “drug related – other”, to get the combined 
effects of intoxication and addiction. Then, 9% is blamed on alcohol and a further 12% 
on alcohol and other drugs in combination. The increase in the latter would reflect the 
increase in property crime to finance drug habits for folks with multiple addictions. 
But all of this is self-report by prisoners asked to attribute blame for their offending. 
Roughly half of those who reported having been intoxicated by only alcohol at the time 
of their offending reported alcohol to be to blame for their offending. Would half of all 
crimes committed by people who are drunk really disappear in the absence of alcohol? 
For many, alcohol use will be incidental to the offence and blaming alcohol may be 
exculpatory. 
Further, slightly less than a quarter of the sample consisted of non-regular offenders – 
people who are not career criminals. Over a quarter were regular property offenders, 15% 
regular multiple offenders, 8% regular violent offenders, 8% regular fraud offenders. 7% 
were drug traffickers and 7% drug buyers. It is easy to imagine the habitual career 
property offender who gives up drinking and is able to turn his life around and stop 
offending. But could half of them who blame alcohol do so? And, more importantly, is it 
alcohol that is then fundamentally causal or underlying personality traits that give rise 
both to alcohol abuse and criminal activity?  
Non-regular offenders were most likely to blame alcohol for their offending (as opposed 
to other drugs), which would be consistent either with their having done something 
impulsive while drunk or with their unfamiliarity with the justice system and expecting 
exculpatory treatment for having blamed alcohol. It would be this group of non-regular 
offenders whose offending would be most likely to be sensitive to alcohol consumption.  
But that group comprises less than a quarter of the prison population and roughly half of 
even that group have had prior offences. 
We agree entirely with CL when they write:  
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“only those crime costs should be estimated where a causal connection can be 
demonstrated between the consumption of a drug and the commission of a crime. A mere 
association between the two is insufficient. To confuse association with causation would 
result in a vast overestimate of the costs of drug-attributable crime.”(p.41)  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to view their method as coming close to finding causal 
relationships. Proper design would measure the elasticity of criminal activity with respect 
to exogenous changes in alcohol consumption. But, studies that properly address 
causality find limited effects of alcohol on crime. Carpenter (2007) shows that a zero 
percent blood alcohol driving limit applied to 18-20 year olds in the United States 
reduced heavy alcohol use among that age group by some thirteen percent but the 
proportion of property crime attributable to 18-20 year olds dropped only by 3.4 percent 
and the proportion of violent crime attributable to that group did not change. As violent 
crime has higher social cost than property crime, the elasticity of overall crime costs to 
drinking seems limited.  
If we assume that Carpenter’s elasticity estimates apply to the population as a whole, a 
ten percent reduction in property crime would require a thirty-eight percent reduction in 
heavy alcohol use. The one hundred and thirty seven percent increase in alcohol prices 
required to achieve that reduction would reduce moderate drinkers’ consumption by sixty 
percent, with consequent reductions in consumer surplus and health benefits of moderate 
drinking.44 And it seems unlikely that adult property crime rates are as elastic to alcohol 
consumption as are youths’. Alcohol excise taxes are therefore a poor and indirect way of 
achieving crime reduction. 
While we revise downwards to zero the estimate of social costs due to forgone prisoner 
earnings, we leave unchanged the other elements of the CL figure despite our serious 
misgivings about the proportion of crimes in which alcohol’s role was causal. 
4.1.10. Health costs 
While moderate alcohol use reduces all-source mortality (Castelnuovo and Donati, 2006), 
health costs are increasing with heavy alcohol use. If health care were provided privately 
with actuarial rates assessed based on individual alcohol consumption, incurred health 
costs falling on the drinker would best be deemed private; those falling on external 
parties such as the victims of drunk drivers would count as external. No private health 
expenditures other than those borne by external parties would then count as a social cost 
of alcohol. 
With a public health system, most health care costs are best viewed as a transfer to those 
incurring health problems from those paying taxes. Transfers are not social costs as they 
are without efficiency consequence, but it may be desirable on equity grounds that 
alcohol excise taxes are able to meet the burden drinkers impose on the health system.  
                                                 
44 Carpenter’s implied elasticity of property crime with respect to heavy alcohol consumption among 
youths is -0.26. Heavy drinkers’ price elasticity of alcohol consumption is -0.28; moderate drinkers’ price 
elasticity of alcohol consumption is -0.44 (Wagenaar et al, 2009). 
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The healthcare costs tabulated by CL, which account for reductions in costs attributable 
to moderate alcohol consumption, apply alcohol-attributable aetiological fractions to total 
medical and hospital expenditures in Australia. CL cite Health expenditure Australia 
2004-05 (Table A1) as source of total health expenditures. However, only sixty-eight 
percent of total health expenditure there tabulated derives from federal, state and local 
government expenditures; the remaining thirty-two percent is covered by private health 
insurance, individual payments, and other insurance schemes. If the mix of private and 
public spending on health care is evenly distributed across sickness categories, roughly a 
third of CL’s tabulated hospital and medical costs must be excluded as internally borne 
through drinkers’ insurance premiums. 
We also worry that the aetiological fractions used may not account adequately for 
comorbidity between alcohol use and pre-existing mental disorders. The aetiological 
fractions used ascribe between twenty-five and thirty percent of male suicides to alcohol; 
in other words, if alcohol disappeared, the suicide rate would drop by more than a quarter 
for adult males over the age of twenty. As alcohol use can often be a form of self-
medication among those with mental illness, whether alcohol plays that substantial a 
causal role in suicides is debatable. Ross (1995) finds that more than half of those with an 
alcohol disorder have a lifetime comorbid psychiatric disorder. Among subcategories for 
which data is presented, alcohol abusers have rates of mood disorders and anxiety 
disorders 2.3 and 1.7 times that of non-abusers. While 9% of alcohol abusers report 
antisocial personality disorders, only 0.6% of non abusers report such disorders. The 
Mental Illness Fellowship of Australia (2005) notes that those with bipolar disorder are 
eleven times more likely to engage in harmful drug or alcohol use than is the general 
population. Kessler et al (1997) find that those with long term alcohol abuse or 
dependence not only have a high probability of also exhibiting another mental disorder 
but also that comorbid DSM-IIIR disorders tend to predate alcohol use disorders.  
Perhaps more importantly, Collins and Lapsley understate the number of conditions for 
which alcohol reduces overall health costs. CL list alcohol as potentially reducing the risk 
of ischaemic heart disease, cholelithiasis, heart failure, stroke and hypertension. The 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans Advisory Committee’s 2010 report provides an 
extensive list of conditions not included in CL’s Table 58 detailing conditions affected by 
alcohol use. Alcohol increases the risk of colon cancer among those consuming more 
than two standard drinks per day: the single medical-cost-augmenting effect of alcohol 
not included by Collins and Lapsley. But moderate alcohol use of one to three drinks per 
day also reduces the risk of Type II diabetes by a half to a third relative to abstainers. 
Heavy drinkers experience higher diabetes risk relative to moderate drinkers, with an 
increase in risk of the same order of magnitude as the decreased risk enjoyed by moderate 
drinkers over abstainers.45 Moderate drinking reduces the incidence of dementia and 
Altzheimer’s;46 low levels of alcohol consumption on the order of half to one standard 
drink per day also reduces the risk of hip fracture. We cannot quantify the reduction in 
net aggregate health costs that would result from inclusion of these factors, but reduced 
                                                 
45 Report of the DGAC on the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010, D7-3. 
46 DGAC, p. D7-9. 
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risk of diabetes seems likely to provide a substantial cost saving where dialysis treatment 
is generally rather expensive. 
Further, because moderate alcohol consumption reduces health costs relative to 
abstinence, we must take extreme care in policy recommendations that seek to reduce the 
health care burden associated with alcohol use by reducing the availability of alcohol or 
by increasing its price. Castelnuovo and Donati’s (2006) metastudy47 found that 
individuals consuming about a standard drink per day enjoyed a fourteen percent 
reduction in risk of all-source mortality experienced by abstainers; drinkers did not 
experience risks above those experienced by abstainers unless they consumed more than 
four drinks per day (two for women). Work by Holahan et al (2010) suggests much larger 
beneficial effects for older persons, with moderate drinkers’ risk of all source mortality 
being half of that experienced by abstainers and heavy drinkers’ risk being slightly lower 
that of abstainers. 
CL report that recent revisions to alcohol aetiological fractions have increased the net 
estimated burden of alcohol use; “this is due to the previous study underestimating the 
number of people who abstain from alcohol or drink less than 0.25 drinks per day.”48 
Because prior numbers had overestimated the number of moderate drinkers relative to 
abstainers, those prior numbers underestimated net health costs associated with alcohol 
use. If the number of teetotalers increases relative to the number of moderate drinkers, net 
health costs of alcohol use increase. As moderate drinkers are more price elastic than 
heavy drinkers,49 the net effect on aggregate health costs of excise tax increases are 
ambiguous. Policies that induce older persons to switch to abstinence from moderate 
drinking substantially increase their risk of Altzheimers, dementia, and mortality. Tax 
instruments cannot avoid these kinds of collateral damage. 
We cannot determine the proportion of nursing home or pharmaceutical costs tallied by 
CL that are borne privately. If any substantial portion is funded privately, the total would 
need to be reduced proportionately. Failure to account for alcohol’s protective effect 
against Altzheimer’s and dementia will lead CL’s estimates to overstate the effect of 
alcohol on nursing home costs. Without access to their background figures, we cannot 
quantify the effect. 
We reduce CL’s assessed medical and hospital costs to account for the portion funded 
privately; total health costs then reduce from $2 billion to $1.6 billion. But the figure 
remains an overestimate absent better accounting for disorders ameliorated by moderate 
alcohol consumption.  
                                                 
47 Note that Castelnuovo and Donati carefully sort between estimates that exclude former drinkers from the 
ranks of abstainers; reported results are for the curve that excludes such confounding.  
48 Australian Burden of Disease report, Begg et. al, p. 84, cited by CL at p. 39. 
49 Wagenaar et al, 2009. Where the price elasticity of demand for alcohol for all drinkers is -0.44, it is only 
-0.28 for heavy drinkers. So a price increase that induces heavy drinkers to reduce their consumption by ten 
percent would cause moderate drinkers to reduce their consumption by more than fifteen percent. 
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4.1.11. Summary 
Collins and Lapsley argue that alcohol imposes social costs of over $15 billion on the 
Australian public. Media and politicians alike interpret this figure as representing real 
costs borne by innocent bystanders: taxpayers and victims of crime. To a first 
approximation, at most only $3.8 billion of the headline figure can count as costs borne 
by such external parties.  We further expect the true figure would be lower if properly 
causal studies of the effect of alcohol on crime rates were used rather than surveys of 
detainee drinking habits. Policing costs of three quarters of a billion dollars hinge on 
whether alcohol can causally be attributed to offending where the offender has had a 
drink on the day of offending and has had a drinking problem. If the proportion of private 
funding for nursing home and pharmaceutical costs are proportionate to private funding 
of hospital and medical costs, a further $230 million would be deducted from aggregate 
social costs. Adequate accounting of the health benefits of moderate drinking on 
relatively expensive conditions like Type II Diabetes would further reduce reported 
health care costs of harmful alcohol use. 
Single’s (2009) article, “Why we should still estimate the costs of substance abuse even if 
we needn’t pay undue attention to the bottom line”, concludes that cost studies are 
helpful for developing priorities for intervention. But if intervention is most justified 
when working to solve market failures rather than minimise some notion of aggregate 
cost that pays little heed to benefits enjoyed, social cost studies following the Collins and 
Lapsley modified COI method are not helpful. If priorities are assessed in order of 
aggregate cost, CL’s ordering begins with loss of life ($4.1 billion), followed by labour 
costs ($3.5 billion), road accidents ($2.6 billion), healthcare ($2 billion), spending on 
alcohol ($1.7 billion), and finally crime ($1.4 billion). If we count only the economic 
costs typically viewed as relevant for policy, including fiscal externalities, the order of 
importance shifts considerably: healthcare costs ($1.6 billion), crime ($1.1 billion) and 
road accidents ($0.7) billion dominate, followed by labour costs ($0.2 billion) and loss of 
life ($0.2 billion). Where aggregate annual Australian alcohol excise and customs 
revenues exceed $4 billion, the case for higher taxes or for more stringent regulation 
seems weak. 
If the point of COI studies is to assess at which points alcohol interventions might best be 
targeted to reduce real social costs, they fail. But if their purpose is rather to influence 
public policy to increase the political salience of particular policy areas as a whole, they 
can be very effective. Single (2009, p. 120) notes one advantage of cost of illness studies 
is their generation of figures helpful “to argue that substance abuse issues merit a high 
place on the public policy agenda”. As discussed in Section 5, below, they have been 
successful to that end. 
4.2. BERL (2009) 
In March 2009, Business and Economic Research Limited (BERL) published “Costs of 
Harmful Alcohol and Other Drug Use”, a report jointly commissioned by the Ministry of 
Health and ACC. BERL was asked to measure the costs of drug and alcohol abuse to New 
Zealand society; the framework used by Collins and Lapsley (2008) was suggested as a 
model. Collins and Lapsley further served as independent external referees of the 
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produced report. BERL calculated annual social costs of alcohol and illicit drug 
consumption of $6.8 billion, including $4.8 billion in social costs from alcohol alone. As 
will be noted in Section 5, below, the BERL study received a fair amount of attention 
from the press and from policy makers as the study coincided with the New Zealand Law 
Commission’s review of alcohol regulation. 
The BERL report’s method is very similar to Collins and Lapsley. Where Collins and 
Lapsley’s discounting of private consumption benefits was implicit to its method, in 
which any potential failure of information or rationality was sufficient to deem all 
privately borne costs as social with no accounting for private benefits, BERL’s 
discounting was more explicit: “We assume that it is irrational to drink alcohol to a 
harmful level and that harmful alcohol use has zero private benefit.” (p. 173) In defence 
of their work, they later argued that their remit was to consider only costs.50 But deeming 
all private costs as socially relevant requires an assumption of no offsetting consumption 
benefits; the assumption of zero private benefit was built into their cost assessment.  
BERL included a few key divergences that further inflated their measured social cost 
relative to an economic cost figure.51 We here take BERL’s cost items in turn, beginning 
with those least plausibly generating external social costs and concluding with those 
representing genuine external costs. Where BERL found some $4.8 billion in social costs 
accruing to alcohol alone, plausible external costs constitute only some five percent of 
their headline figure. 
4.2.1. Drug Production Costs 
BERL followed Collins and Lapsley in deeming the potential for market failure as 
providing sufficient basis for deeming socially relevant all privately borne costs of 
harmful drinking. Where CL assumed, without particular justification, that thirty percent 
of alcohol consumed in Australia was without offsetting benefit as having been consumed 
by addicted drinkers, BERL, with similar lack of justification, reasoned that half of all 
alcohol consumed in New Zealand was consumed by harmful drinkers – those men 
consuming more than four standard drinks (two for women) on average per day were 
reckoned to receive no consumption benefit whatsoever from their drinking. A male 
consuming two Imperial pints of standard strength beer per day received no enjoyment 
from his consumption, by BERL’s assumption. Worse, BERL included taxes paid on that 
harmfully consumed alcohol as a social cost of harmful drinking.52 Spending on alcohol 
constituted $700 million of BERL’s headline figure. The only portion of this that can 
plausibly be viewed as a social cost would be incremental excess spending on alcohol by 
                                                 
50 “BERL rejects criticism of study” 6 July 2009, available at http://www.berl.co.nz/1026a1.page 
51 A full examination of the BERL report is available as a working paper, Burgess and Crampton 2009. 
Figures presented here represent a revised assessment subsequent to more thorough examination of the CL 
working model on which the BERL figure was based. In particular, we have revised treatment of 
“consumption resources saved”, leading to larger final social costs. 
52 They corrected this after publication of our working paper and subsequent to comments by one of the 
authors of the current study, Crampton, at the 2009 New Zealand Economic Association Annual Meetings. 
The $4.8 billion figure continues, however, to be cited. 
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those whose consumption exceeds their individual optimal level; were such an excess 
cost included, we would also need to weigh that excess cost against the benefits of 
drinking to drinkers. Consequently, we count no personal alcohol expenditure as 
constituting a social cost. 
4.2.2. Intangible costs of loss of life 
BERL counts as a social cost the value of life years lost due to excess alcohol 
consumption. The figures here suffer from two substantial problems.  
First, when tallying the health costs of alcohol, and as noted in Section 4, above, CL 
netted from gross health costs some of the monetised health benefits of alcohol 
consumption. BERL took the alcohol aetiological fractions provided by CL but set equal 
to zero any item reporting a negative aetiological fraction, assuming away the potentially 
beneficial effects of drinking. While the BERL report was skeptical of any research 
suggesting any possible health benefits from moderate alcohol consumption, it deemed 
harmful consumption as by definition taking place beyond the range in which there were 
possible health benefits. However, cardioprotective effectives of alcohol extend well into 
the range in which all source mortality is adversely affected by alcohol use.53 
Consequently, BERL’s intangible cost is strongly overstated. 
More importantly, barring those deaths accruing to external victims of drunk drivers, 
these loss-of-life costs fall on the drinker and consequently are properly viewed as 
internal. Costs falling on victims of drink drivers and alcohol-related homicides 
constituted less than five percent of BERL’s figure: only some $67 million of their $1.52 
billion can potentially be deemed a social cost. 
Finally, counting both intangible costs of loss of life and costs of forgone output due to 
loss of life constitutes double-counting where the value of life lost is based on a 
willingness-to-pay measure of the value of a statistical life, as noted in discussion of CL 
previously. BERL use the value of a statistical life year provided by the New Zealand 
Ministry of Transport. The Transport figure is based on willingness to pay for safety 
improvements that avoid a statistical death. It is also telling that the Ministry of 
Transport’s estimates of the social costs of car accidents include only loss of output for 
those incurring temporary disability, not for fatalities.54  
4.2.3. Labour costs  
BERL follows Collins and Lapsley in using a measure well in excess of a worker’s annual 
wage as the measure of lost output from those experiencing premature mortality; they 
were slightly more explicit in their description of their method than were Collins and 
Lapsley. They write: 
                                                 
53 Corrao et al, 2000, find in meta-analysis that alcohol’s protective effects against coronary heart disorders 
continue at alcohol consumption levels double the lower bound of BERL’s threshold for harmful 
consumption. Heavy drinkers have greater risk of all-source mortality; however, counting only those 
disorders where alcohol’s effects are pernicious rather biases results. 
54 See New Zealand Ministry of Transport (2009) and (2010). 
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The value to society of lost output is considerably larger than lost earnings alone, for 
example, in addition to lost wages there is also lost profit. As such, the earnings profiles 
were scaled up to reflect the difference between wages and residual value added. The 
resulting output profiles were based on the assumption that the average GDP per FTE 
(BERL Forecast Database) is 1.87 times the average wage income (StatsNZ).(pp. 35-6) 
The decision to scale forgone wages added over $650 million to BERL’s headline social 
costs of alcohol figure and constituted a fifteen percent increase in the headline figure. 
The WHO’s Best Practice guidelines (Moller and Matic, 2010) deem a method more 
conservative than this as having been discredited since the late 1990s.  
There are further problems with simply multiplying wages by the ratio of GDP per full 
time employee over average wages. The ratio of the two is an average that applies to the 
economy as a whole; for that average also to hold at the margin requires that workers 
have a constant value marginal product. This is implausible in any economy with 
diminishing returns to production factors; otherwise, average product would exceed 
marginal product. And, it is implausible to have other than a diminishing marginal 
product of labour in economies with factors of production beyond just labour.55 
Crampton and Burgess (2009) adjusted BERL’s figure by excising the multiplier they 
applied to labour costs and instead took the total value of forgone wages plus a ten 
percent margin for transitional frictions potentially imposed on employers as the total 
private and public costs. We further applied minor adjustment for labour market 
heterogeneity: workers dying from excess alcohol use are unlikely to have average labour 
market characteristics. We there also followed BERL in counting as a pecuniary but 
external benefit some $300 million in consumption resources saved through premature 
alcohol-related mortality. On further examination of CL’s method, generally followed by 
BERL, we have revised to exclude such adjustment.  
CL and BERL attempt to estimate the change in GDP that would result absent alcohol-
related premature death, injury, illness or absenteeism under the assumption that no 
worker can ever be replaced by either man or machine; they subtract from those estimates 
as a transfer benefit those resources that would otherwise have been consumed by a 
deceased worker. If we include as social cost only those labour-related costs externally 
imposed, discounting forgone private earnings, we cannot offset that measure by 
resources released by premature mortality.  
Our revised figure includes only a ten percent frictional component that is plausibly 
imposed on employers where workers are paid their marginal product. Counting the full 
forgone earnings of external victims of drink drivers and of crime victims would be 
defensible but for that the value of those earnings is already incorporated in the value of 
lives lost; including both measures would constitute double-counting. 
These adjustments reduced total costs to a little over half of BERL’s headline figure, from 
$1.5 billion to $806 million. The external component of those costs, $174 million, 
included the ten percent frictional margin in addition to all forgone wages accruing to the 
                                                 
55 We thank Seamus Hogan for this point.  
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external victims of drink drivers and of alcohol-related homicide. Plausibly external costs 
of forgone labour totaled approximately twelve percent of BERL’s headline labour cost. 
4.2.4. Road Crash Costs 
Costs of road accidents falling on parties external to the drink driver’s vehicle are the 
most plausible social cost of alcohol. BERL assesses some $200 million in costs accruing 
to property damage, travel delays, insurance administration, and emergency services, 
with loss of life, health care, and forgone earnings elsewhere counted. The bulk of these 
costs, $132 million, are derived from insurance administration. However, the figure bears 
little relation to insurance administration cost statistics published by the Insurance 
Council of New Zealand. BERL attributed half of all insurance overhead costs to alcohol. 
But total insurance overhead costs were $763 million; total car crash claims were $739 
million, and alcohol is involved in only a small minority of total car crashes. Correction 
for this and other errors in BERL’s method reduced the total figure from $200 million to 
$74 million, some $38 million of which fell externally. External social costs of road 
crashes were less than twenty percent of BERL’s headline figure. 
4.2.5. Lost quality of life 
Victims of alcohol-related crime, including drink driving accidents, suffer real diminution 
in quality of life. Netting costs falling internally and adjusting for BERL’s overestimate of 
alcohol’s contribution to overall crime costs, discussed in depth below, we reduced 
BERL’s figure from $42 million to $24 million. 
4.2.6. Crime 
The Single et al (2003) guidelines warn that estimates of crime costs of alcohol hinge on 
finding plausible causal relationships between alcohol use and crime. BERL estimates the 
contribution of alcohol to offending by use of surveys of prisoners, who are asked 
whether alcohol contributed to their incarceration. BERL assumes that those answering 
“some”, “a lot”, or “all” to that question would not have committed the crime absent 
alcohol use. It is certainly possible that harmful alcohol use can contribute to criminal 
offending. But is it plausible that everyone answering “some” to this survey question, 
where a prisoner may view alcohol dependence as exculpatory, would have failed to have 
offended absent alcohol use? We adjusted BERL’s estimates downwards by a third to 
approximately remove those answering “some”, but would strongly prefer that crime 
estimates were based on more causal studies of the relationship between alcohol and 
crime.  
BERL further assumes that expenditures on private security alarms, fencing, and 
deadlocks would decrease proportionately with crime reduction in the absence of harmful 
alcohol use.56 However, most of these expenditures are fixed costs, not marginal.  It is 
plausible that some individuals would choose not to pay to have their alarm system 
activated were crime to decrease, but decreased preventative measures would be met by 
increased opportunistic property crime.  Expenditures on preventative measures would 
                                                 
56 See footnote 111 of the BERL report. 
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not decrease proportionately with a decrease in crime; furthermore, BERL cites no 
evidence that the elasticity of preventative expenditures with respect to crime rates is 
unitary.   
External crime costs were assessed at $410 million. 
4.2.7. Health care costs 
BERL followed CL in applying alcohol attributable fractions to health care expenditures; 
however, and as noted earlier, they set equal to zero the attributable aetiological fraction 
for any disorders where alcohol use reduces disease burden. They write: 57 
We use Collins and Lapsley’s (2008) attributable fractions in our estimates of AOD-
related hospital use and mortality rates. These fractions indicate some alcohol use may 
be beneficial but any other drug use is harmful. To concentrate on harmful drug use, zero 
fractions were applied to conditions for which alcohol provided a net benefit, that is, for 
conditions with negative attributable fractions. This approach is likely to underestimate 
the harmful impacts of drug use. Although the net beneficial impact was removed, the 
harmful component for those conditions could not be estimated. However, Collins and 
Lapsley advise that the harmful impact for beneficial conditions is minute. 
Rather than worrying that their measure overstated the health costs of heavy alcohol use 
by discounting the documented health benefits of even heavy alcohol use for coronary 
heart disease, BERL worried that zeroing out CL’s net positive attributable fractions still 
understated the health costs of harmful drinking. For example, if coronary heart disease is 
reduced for the majority of heavy drinkers but a smaller subset has increased heart 
disease, BERL lamented that CL’s net aetiological fractions prevented their weighing 
only the costs incurred by that smaller subset. 
In Crampton and Burgess (2009), we reduced health expenditures by removing that 
portion paid privately and by deflating crime-related alcohol health costs by the same 
fraction applied to crime costs; we noted that the costs remained a strong overestimate 
absent correction for BERL’s having assumed equal to zero any positive attributable 
fractions. External health costs were estimated at $255 million, but with potential for 
downwards revision were BERL’s internal workings made available such that adjusted 
aetiological fractions could be applied.  
4.2.8. Summary 
In his review of alcohol laws in New Zealand, Law Commission President Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer weighed BERL’s estimated $5.3 billion58 in alcohol-related social costs against an 
alcohol excise tax take of some $795 million59 and on this basis argued for increased 
taxation and regulation. However, the external portion of those costs totaled only some 
$967 million, and this figure is likely overstated absent correction for BERL’s 
                                                 
57 At footnote 12. 
58 Palmer, 2009. He here used the figure that included joint costs of alcohol in interaction with other drugs; 
our revision began with the baseline of $4.8 billion in costs attributable to alcohol alone. 
59 $713 million in 2005/6, the fiscal year for which BERL’s cost estimates were derived. 
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overestimation of health care costs and inability to attribute a causal portion to crime 
costs.  
BERL’s tabulation put loss of life as the largest cost of harmful alcohol use in New 
Zealand ($1.52 billion), followed by labour costs ($1.48 billion), drug production costs 
($699 million), crime costs ($562 million), health care ($290 million), road crashes ($200 
million), and lost quality of life ($42 million). The rank order of these cost items changes 
substantially when we consider the external, policy relevant costs: crime is most 
important ($410 million) followed by health care ($255 million), labour costs ($174 
million), loss of life ($67 million), road crashes not included elsewhere ($38 million) and 
lost quality of life ($24 million). An economic cost accounting, which emphasises 
external costs, produces a sharply different order of priority to the healthist accounting 
which combines private and external costs.  If the external costs of reduced productivity 
were the primary social cost of alcohol, as implied by BERL’s figures, excise options 
could be an appropriate policy solution, perhaps alongside policy changes enabling 
employers to make alcohol counseling a condition of continued employment for 
employees with alcohol dependence issues; if crime costs are the largest external cost of 
alcohol use, excise policy is a blunt tool for reducing those costs. 
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5. Policy Influence of COI Studies 
In Australia, Collins and Lapsley’s (2008) estimate of $15 billion in social costs of 
alcohol has been cited thirty times on Australian television, in news, current affairs, and 
talk shows; has been cited seven times on radio; has been used in at least twenty-six 
opinion pieces and editorials, generally in support of stricter alcohol policy; and, has 
appeared in an additional seventy-nine news stories. Collin and Lapsley (2008) has been 
mentioned in the Australian Parliament on twelve occasions by nine MPs from the 
Australian Labor Party, generally in support of increased alcohol excise taxes – 
particularly on “alco-pops”, and an additional twenty-one times by five senators from the 
Greens, Family First, and Labor.60 Subsequent to these references, substantial excise tax 
increases were levied in Australia. That popular concern over the apparent social cost of 
alcohol contributed substantially to pressure for stricter alcohol control cannot be proved, 
but would be consistent with Holcombe and Sobel’s (2001) finding that the political 
process is sensitive to pecuniary externalities. 
In order to see whether the influence of the Collins and Lapsley number is typical of 
social cost studies, we compared the level of media and parliamentary interest to two 
other studies around the same time, BERL (2009) and Rehm et al (2006). While cross-
country differences in the number of media outlets, news digitization, and searchability 
make precise comparison difficult and unreliable, broad and tentative conclusions are 
possible. We focus only on studies for around the same period in order to avoid some of 
the bias which comes from increasing digitization over time. Were we to use earlier 
studies (such as the American study published in 2002 by Harwood et al), we would 
surely find a much lower proportion of news stories preserved.  
BERL’s estimate of the social cost of harmful alcohol use in New Zealand, which 
followed the Collins and Lapsley method but reached a much higher headline figure, 
featured prominently in the New Zealand media. Variations on the figure, normally 4.8 
billion, 5 billion, or 5.3 billion, were cited uncritically in at least 32 newspaper news 
stories or features. The number was often cited as factual background by the reporter or 
quoted directly or indirectly by interviewees, most commonly Sir Geoffrey Palmer, head 
of the Law Commission and charged with reviewing New Zealand’s policies regarding 
alcohol. Palmer would often contrast the number with excise revenue from alcohol and 
make an implicitly Pigouvian argument for increases in taxation.61 Palmer or those 
quoting him would also often misleadingly claim that the $5.3 billion burden fell on 
taxpayers. An article in The Dominion Post, for example, states that “Sir Geoffrey 
                                                 
60 Counts as of October 2010. Full citations available on request. 
61 “It is an axiomatic principle of welfare economics that the costs engendered by an activity should be 
internalized to that activity.  That way the allocation of resources is greatly improved because the 
consumers do not buy the product at a subsidized cost but at a cost that reflects the externalities the use of 
the product causes.  This is the very reason we have the current excise tax on alcohol to prevent harm. But 
the gap between the current tax take of $795 million for excise tax and the estimated alcohol costs in the 
BERL study - $5.296 billion, is substantial.” Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Address to New Zealand 
Police, 2009. Palmer clearly understood BERL’s figure as providing a measure of externally imposed cost 
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deplored the gap between the $795 million raised by excise tax and the $5.3 billion social 
cost of drinking, and said drinkers, not the taxpayer, should pay the bills.”62  
At least six editorials or opinion pieces cited the number as factual background, and three 
criticized the number. One of these three was written by Crampton and the other two 
cited the work of Crampton and Burgess. The figure was also mentioned on television 
and radio, including both major 6pm television news shows.  
Only two mainstream newspaper articles questioned the number (both citing Crampton 
and Burgess). The National Business Review also had a number of stories describing the 
debate between BERL and Crampton and Burgess.   
In the media, the number was cited in support of many policy interventions, most 
commonly associated with the recommendations of the Law Commission report, which 
included raising excise taxes, lowering the purchase age, mandating bar closing hours, 
and lowering the alcohol limit for driving. The number was also cited as an argument for 
advertising restrictions and a number of other interventions. The number was also 
mentioned twice in parliamentary debates, both by Labour MPs on the second reading of 
the Sale of Liquor (Youth Alcohol Harm Reduction) Amendment Bill, on 17 June, 2009. 
The 2006 Canadian study by Rehm et al took a different methodological approach and 
reached a lower headline social cost number than either Collins and Lapsley or BERL 
They claimed to be studying only external costs, and therefore excluded the purchase cost 
of abused alcohol. They also excluded intangible costs. The result was a lower headline 
social cost figure: 1.26% of GDP, compared to 1.59% for Collins and Lapsley and 4.47% 
for BERL 
Interestingly, it also seems to have generated less interest from the media and politicians, 
and has been misinterpreted less often. We were able to find only eleven news stories and 
three opinion pieces, all of which cited the $14.6 billion figure, sometimes rounded to 
$15 billion or $463 per capita, uncritically. Some stories were reporting on the Rehm et al 
study, while others used the social cost number as factual background to other stories 
about alcohol issues.  We were also unable to find any parliamentary mentions of the 
number, though it was used in as background in one bill.63 While this difference might be 
at least in part due to differences in searchability, and our location in the antipodes gives 
us greater access to local sources, comparing the level of attention each numbers received 
from its country’s most-circulated daily newspaper tells a similar story: The Rehm et al 
results were reported or cited only three times in the Toronto Star. The Collins and 
Lapsley number was mentioned in the Herald Sun ten times, and the BERL number was 
mentioned in the New Zealand Herald six times. 
The number also seems to be used misleadingly less often than in Australia or New 
Zealand. We were unable to find any cases of reporters of interviewees comparing the 
social cost number to excise tax revenue, and only one case where the number was 
                                                 
62 Wood, Stacey. 25/04/2009 “More costly alcohol in plan to deter abuse” The Dominion Post, pA9.  
63 Bill C-15: An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to make related and 
consequential amendments to other Acts, p. 4. 
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obviously interpreted incorrectly, as the cost to employers.64 While more careful and 
systematic study would be required to robustly test whether the Collins and Lapsley 
method’s more complex interpretation allows for greater intentional or unintentional 
misrepresentation in the media, our comparison of the Australian, New Zealand, and 
Canadian studies does seem to point in that direction.   
                                                 
64 White, Patrick. Mar. 26, 2008. "Hospitality sector tops list of industries with booze problems" The Globe 
and Mail. 
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6. Discussion 
The headline figures in Collins and Lapsley (2008) and BERL (2009) can be understood 
as approximately measuring the dollar value of labour and capital reallocated in the 
economy because consumers choose to consume alcohol in quantities different to that 
which is health maximising. It is one thing to acknowledge both the external and 
privately-borne costs associated with alcohol use. These costs are substantial, in the order 
of $975 million and $2.3 billion, respectively, annually in NZ, against which is set some 
$713 million in excise tax and uncounted consumption benefits. It is quite another to 
infer from the existence of these costs irrationality on the part of anyone who consumes 
more than is healthy and to presume zero benefit for any of their consumption when they 
do. The method deployed in the healthist literature produces large numbers that have no 
relationship with economic value added or destroyed, consumer surplus, social cost or 
GDP. 
The healthist literature passes off headline costs as representing value in a two step 
process. First, it assumes without evidence that consumption in excess of an 
epidemiological standard, or consumption that results in experienced probabilistic 
downside costs, is due to irrational decision-making. Second, the healthist literature cites 
assumed imperfections in rationality and information as reason to dismiss by assumption 
the existence of all economic benefits including enjoyment from such consumption. 
On these assumptions depend the majority of headline costs in healthist reports. The 
presumption of irrationality ignores the rather obvious possibility that consumers 
generally do not pursue health maximisation to exclusion of all other possible objectives 
and instead will sometimes rationality choose to consume more or less alcohol than is 
recommended by health experts in pursuit of objectives other than health maximisation. 
Even if irrationality, and not preferences, explains deviation from health maximisation, 
the healthist literature misuses this explanation for behaviour by citing it in support of 
discarding all consumption benefits, causing all associated private costs to be counted as 
a social cost. 
Quite apart from the extraordinary nature of this approach, unknown (to our knowledge) 
in the economics literature outside of Cost of Illness studies, is the fact that it entirely 
abandons revealed preference and in place of consumers’ preferences substitutes 
desiridatum given by the healthist method. This is pure paternalism: information revealed 
by consumption choices is discarded by assumption. Why this consumption occurs is not 
explained by the healthist literature other than by appeal to irrationality and error; the 
implied view is that this is a massive, repeated, chronic mistake by up to a sixth of the 
adult populations of Australia and New Zealand, accounting for up to half of all alcohol 
consumed. By abandoning revealed preference, Cost of Illness studies also discard any 
claim to measuring economic costs which can only rightly be understood in the context of 
revealed preference. 
These objections are given no serious consideration in the healthist literature. We 
emphasise that such objections depend neither on perfect rationality nor on perfect 
information. It is common ground that consumers err and that occasionally terrible 
outcomes occur. However, it does not follow from either of these observations that 
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consumer decision-making is irrational, or that there are no consumer benefits from any 
potentially harmful drinking: yet on these assumptions both BERL and CL depend.  
Though the COI method developed by CL and others produces figures without direct 
economic interpretation or positive policy implication, innovations by Collins and 
Lapsley in packaging their figures as representing net social cost have granted those 
figures de facto policy relevance. In New Zealand, the Rt. Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer, in 
the midst of his review of New Zealand’s alcohol regulatory regime, apparently mistook 
BERL’s figure as representing a cost borne largely by persons other than the drinker 
himself.65 In Australia, the $15 billion CL figure, less than $4 billion of which could 
possibly be considered as policy relevant, was described in the Australian Parliament by 
M.P. Bernard Ripoll as “a massive cost to every single Australian and every single 
taxpayer”66; by M.P. James Tournour as a social cost to which must be added the 
economic costs of injuries and absenteeism67; by New South Wales Police Commissioner 
Andrew Scipione as constituting only the costs of alcohol-related crime68, by The Age as 
a cost to which needed to be added the cost of lives lost69; and by the Courier Mail as a 
potential saving to the country if Australia were to “cut back on the booze.”70 In these 
cases, the $15 billion figure was generally viewed as a lower bound to which ought be 
added a host of other costs rather than a figure mostly counting the costs that drinkers 
impose on themselves. 
As Holcombe and Sobel (2001) point out, voters are not insensitive to fiscal externalities. 
By presenting costs drinkers impose upon themselves as social costs to the country, COI 
measures following from CL may help build popular support for paternalistic policies. 
Embedding paternalism in the assumptions of the model rather than advocating 
paternalistic policies directly appeals to voters’ pocketbooks; where a weak liberalism 
might otherwise oppose paternalistic policies, voters might sensibly object to footing the 
perceived bill for the downside costs of others’ drinking. 
The true cost of cost studies then is not the amounts paid by Ministries of Health for 
consultancy reports. Social cost studies presenting private costs as socially relevant build 
public support for paternalistic policy while hiding the policy’s embedded paternalism.  
Voters take the cost measures as impartial measures of the cost they’re called upon to 
bear due to others’ actions and shift outward their demand for corrective measures.  
Equilibrium policy adjusts towards greater paternalism. Consequent losses in consumer 
surplus are the true cost of cost studies. 
                                                 
65 See Palmer, 2009, previously cited. 
66 Hansard, 25 February 2009. 
67 Hansard, 24 February 2009. 
68 Cited by Steve Larkin, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 May 2008. 
69 Medew and Munro, The Age, 26 August 2009. 
70 18 September 2008 
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